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Abstract
CANOpen is a communication protocol and device specification used in auto-
mation system. It is a commercial protocol typically related with embedded
networking. Since embedded systems are widely used in automations, CAN-
Open does not only exist in our daily life, but also in variety of industries, such
as household applications, automobiles, medical equipment, subsea facilities
and so on. Some of these applications are so sophisticated that it does not allow
any fatal defect, like medical equipments, and some other applications are too
resource-consuming to tolerate configuration delay, such as subsea platform.
Although it is not a short period since CANOpen protocol is proposed, there
might still be some uncovered issues. Commercial systems tests commonly rely
on the specific enviroment, which is useful to discover bugs in specific applic-
ations. But in general, it is not an efficient way to find potential issues in pro-
tocol levels. Hence, we need a method to help us solve this problem. Formal
verification, providing greate contributions to software and hardware system
testing, is a potential method to test a protocol itself, as well, specific applica-
tions where the protocol is applied to. Maude is formal declarative formal lan-
guages based on mathematical theory of rewrite logic. Compared to traditional
programming languages, a declarative language places emphasis on modeling
with naturalness, ease and preciseness. Full Maude is an extension of Maude
which adds the notation of object-oriented modeling manner. In these thesis,
we model some key parts of CANOpen using Full Maude, which our valida-
tion work also relies on. Since CANOpen is a complicated protocol, modeling
the entire functions of CANOpen is a great task. Dividing CANOpen into two
logical functions as communication and controlling parts, we focus our attention
on controlling function which includes Emergency Service (EMCY) and Network
Managerment (NMT). Using Full Maude, we build the model of the controlling
function based on both equation logic and rewriting logic. The resulting model
is a translation from the human-language-described standard to a formal form
iii
specification, with which we then do validation on to prove the soundness of
related parts of CANOpen.
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Chapter 1
Background
An offshore platform, also known as an oil platform is a large structure with
facilities to drill wells, to extract and process oil and natural gas, and to
temporarily store product until it can be brought to shore for refining and
marketing. The drive of exploring oil and gas offshore started over one
century ago. The initial developments were simply extending its exploration
and production operations with land-based rigs, wellheads and pipelines to
shallow water barges. This evolution from land to sea occurred in 1897 with
the first derrick placed atop a wharf on the California (USA) coast[1]. As
offshore technologies advanced to conquer increasingly hostile and challenging
environments, offshore drilling moved forward to two directions. First,
predictably, wells were drilled at greater water depth year by year. Second,
special equipments for subsea drillings entered into the water. More and more
of the operations originally performed at surface are moving to the seafloor[2].
Today’s subsea technology covers a wide range of equipments and activities:
blowout preventer, fluid pump, water seperator, electrical power distribution
system, etc. On top of the water, there are power unit supplying the energy and
central computer for monitor and control of all subsea equipments. Figure 1.1
depicts a simple offshore system block diagram.
The connection between equiments and equipments to topside control facilities
are based on ethernet. Typically, within each subsea equipment, there
are several actuators and sensors connected by Control Area Network bus
(CAN bus) system. CAN bus is a embedded bus standard designed to
allow microcontrollers and devices to communicate with each other within a
embedded system without a host computer.
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Figure 1.1: block diagram of a simple offshore system
Referring to Open System Interconnection (OSI) seven layer model, CAN
bus provides physical layer and data link layer functions for embedded
systems. For equipments to work appropriately, we also need some upper
layer protocols or standards. CANOpen[6] is a higher-level communication
protocol for embedded systems. It was first released in 1995 by CiA designed
for automobiles. Born to be a commercial protocol, CANOpen has one big
advantage that it is a framework for programmable systems as well as different
devices, interfaces and applications. CANOpen extends rapidly in the industry
segments, such as vehicles, medical facilities, printing machines, HVAC
(heating, ventilating, air-conditioning) and so on. Some of the application areas
cannot tolerate faults, such as medical system. Some of the application areas
are time-sensitive, because delay may bring losses of millions of dollars each
day.
The time-sensitive problem is especially obvious in the subsea industry. Subsea
systems are expected to operate on the seabed without maintenance for 25 to 30
years[5]. Any error recovery or device maintenance will also affect oil and gas
production. Additionally, the cost of downhole system repair is not a a small
amount. Typically, the control equipment of a downhole platform is smaller
than the average car[5], meaning that it is more sophisticated to fix.
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Maude is a high-performance reflective language and system supporting both
equational and rewriting logic specification and programming for a wide range
of applications[3]. It is also a formal reasoning tool that can be used to model
and analyze communications and communication networks. Communication
protocols are high-level descriptions of distributed computer systems, and
include broadcast and multicast protocols, database protocols, and security
protocols. Such protocols are notoriously hard to design and understand due to
nondeterminism and reactivity. Maude is a widely used state-of-the-art formal
specification language and tool, and has been shown to be well suited to specify
and analyze a wide range of sophisticated communication protocols[4]. This
thesis concerns the modeling and verification of network communication in
subsea equipments by Maude.
1.1 Motivation and Challenges
To control and solve time-sensitive problems in the offshore oil and gas
industry, Det Norske Veritas & Germanischer Lloyd (DNV GL) is dedicated
to conformance testing for subsea systems and pays much attention to the
system emergency handling. DNV GL is the leading technical advisor to the
global oil and gas industry, working with the sector to enable safe, reliable
and enhanced performance in projects and operations. Through world-class
technical assurance, advisory and risk management services, DNV GL helps
customers to perform on time and to budget, even in the most demanding
environments.
In addition to the general problem, DNV GL has met another issue. Equipments
used for constructing a subsea system are typically provided by different
manufacturers. When devices are delivered to the platform, the sooner all
devices can be integrated together to work, the less deferred costs are. For the
whole system to work properly, it is necessary to have a standard to conform to.
CANOpen is one of the protocols which is widely applied in the offshore oil and
gas industry. This thesis focuses on the application layer and communication
profile of CANOpen which is describe by the standard of CiA301. So in the
remaining parts, when we use CANOpen, we mean CANOpen in CiA301.
CiA301 consists of a many sub-protocols of CANOpen, It depicts not only the
high-level system behaviors but also each byte and bit of the protocol messages.
Although all manufacturers claim their products fully comply with CANOpen,
the fact is that, they cannot work compatibly.
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The objective of this master project is to help DNV GL to expose more system
compatible problems before equipments are delivered to the working site. The
problems could be helpful in the equipment developments and testing phase.
But there are some limitations related to DNV GL’s problem description. They
cannot provide more details on the problem, and the equipment is also a black
box for them. We do not know the actual symptom, so we cannot tell what
causes the problem. It may be the transition failure or the defect of CANOpen
protocol. On the other hand, because of the confidential problem, DNV GL
cannot provide a real case for us to study.
The only thing we know is that all manufacturers use the CANOpen standard
CiA301[6] as the guide to develop their own equipments. So our analysis
has to focus on the CANOpen standard itself, without considering application
behaviors. Thus, our goal is to find out if there are some issues of CANOpen in
protocol levels, instead of focusing on one case. These issues are commonly
existing in subsea systems, and equipments abiding CANOpen standard
potentially have those problems. If there are systems to be evaluated, DNV
GL could then include the found issues into their verification process. Hence,
potential problems could be exposed before equipments are transported to the
project site.
1.2 Research Statements
The work on this thesis consist of the following main parts:
• We build a formal model of the CANOpen protocol focusing on applica-
tion layer by Maude. This model is based on the CANOpen specification
CiA301.
• We explore analysis technologies such as simulation and reachability
analysis on the formal CANOpen model.
• We try to take advantage of the formal model in later development phase
of subsea equipment, i.e. testing phase.
The motivation for our study is to help real projects in the equipments
developments and testing of the subsea industry. The problem addressed in
this thesis can be summarized by the following questions:
1. How can we use Maude and rewriting logic to model a complex
communication protocol such as CANOpen?
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2. What are the benefits of formal analysis when applied to the CANOpen
protocol?
3. Considering validations, can issues discovered by our analysis be under-
stood by the application engineer? Are the issues discovered relevant and
realistic for equipment suppliers using CANOpen?
4. How can we identify the discovered issues on real systems under test?
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
To be more understandable, we will try to present our research results in a
systematic way. The rest of this thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 gives an overview of the CANOpen protocol, as well, the basic
knowledge of CAN bus which are related to formal model. We introduce
the CANOpen and CAN bus through a simple vehicle example.
• Chapter 3 gives a high-level introduction of Maude, including equation
logic, rewrite logic and the application of rules which are used in our
formal model.
• Chapter 4 dives into more details of the CANOpen protocol and the CAN
bus system. Along with explaination of the protocol, we will show how
various parts of the CANOpen protocl and the CAN bus are fomalized in
Maude.
• Chapter 5 presents the performed analysis on different parts of the
CANOpen protocol both separately and together. In addition, we will
show some sample test cases obtained from our analysis, which could be
useful in CANOpen application development and testing.
• Chapter 6 presents the conclusion and possible future works.
The main part of the thesis will not fully cover all aspects of the Maude model.
However, Appendix A contains all technique details the complete Maude code.
7
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Chapter 2
Overview of CANOpen and
CAN Bus
In this chapter, using a vehicle example, we will give a more detailed
introduction of CANOpen and CAN bus. We will explain how parts of a
vehicle work using CAN bus and CANOpen protocol, then we have a more
clear recognition of how CANOpen systems behave through the concrete
example. Only parts of the protocol which are related to construction of
our formal model will be introduced. For the full introduction of CAN bus
and CANOpen, one can see [7] and [8]. CANOpen, as a communication
protocol, complies with OSI 7-layers reference model of Figure 2.1. This
model defines 7 layers from physical media layer up to application layer.
Unlike most on-chip communication interfaces which only implement the first
layer functionality, CAN bus also provides partial layer 2 functionality. As
illustrated in Figure 2.1, CANOpen provides application layer functionalities
and bypasses the other layers that are located between application layer and
data link layer. Furthermore, it also defines the communication profiles of CAN
bus applications. Theoretically, CANOpen can work properly on top of any
type of network model which provides functionalities of physical and data link
layer, such as Ethernet. But in practice, CANOpen is mostly applied with CAN
bus.
The OSI 7-layer reference model seperates specific functionalities into different
layers. To make sure exchangeability of adjacent layers, there are defined
interfaces that should be obeyed by implementations. Interface specifications,
bring not only interoperations of implementations in different layers, but also
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overheads that are unacceptable for embedded applications. This is one of
the reasons why CANOpen only implements parts of functionalities in higher
layers. Before introducing the vehicle example, we will give a brief introduction
of CAN bus.
Figure 2.1: OSI 7-layers Reference Model
2.1 High Level of CAN Bus System
Development of the CAN bus started originally in 1983[9]. It was first officially
introduced in February of 1986, by Robert Bosch GmbH at the Society of
Automotive Engineers congress. Ever since low costs CAN microcontroller
appeared, CAN become a prevalent network technology. Today, almost every
new passenger car manufactured in Europe is equipped with at least one CAN
network. Also used in other types of vehicles, from trains to ships, as well as
in industrial controls, CAN is one of the most dominating bus protocols maybe
even the leading serial bus system worldwide.
As the name suggests, serial bus implies serial communication system which
is the process of sending data one bit at a time, sequentially, over a
communication channel. This is in contrast to to networks we commonly see,
such as Ethernet, where several bits are sent as a whole in the network. If there
are several bits to be transfered in a CAN bus system, the next one cannot be
sent until the preceding one is delivered. This important feature decides that
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at any time, there is at most one message in the CAN bus system, since one
message consists of several bits typically.
Compared to earlier automobile communication network, CAN provides a
much simpler bus system. Before CAN bus was introduced, devices in the same
automatic system are connected using multiple cables. Additionally, to ensure
that messages could be delivered to appropriate devices, placement of different
devices must be considered as well, which is less efficient and more complex.
Now, one CAN bus can replace almost all cables; devices required to send or
receive messages only need to be plugged into one single bus. Moreover, each
message will be received in the same period by all devices connected to the
CAN bus system. That means the distance between the sender and receivers
will not impact messages transmission. So the problem related to the placement
of devices can be completed avoided. This new feature also provides flexibility
to add and remove devices in CAN bus system.
In fact, messages in CAN bus are broadcast, and all devices connected to the
bus system can communication with each other. A message transfered on the
bus can be received by every node. In another word, a message is related to
one sender and multiple receivers. Different receivers have different physical
distances from the sender, so a bit is not delivered to receivers at the same
time. The hardware provides a mechanism which guarantees that each bit is
delivered in a fixed period. Since data is transfered bit by bit, before the last bit
of a message is delivered to all nodes, CAN bus will not allow a new message
to be transmitted.
2.2 A Simple Vehicle Example
Since CAN bus and CANOpen was first designed for automobile industry,
Figure 2.2 is an example of a topological structure of CAN-based network used
in an automobile system.
• Control Unit could be s small computer which has logical process
capability. It collects data from other devices, responses requests from
them and manipulates them.
• Thermal Sensor can test temperature in vehicle and send the data back
toControl Unit . If the temperature is too high, Control Unit could send
control message to Ari Condition to indicate it to start to cool. Likewise,
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Figure 2.2: Topological Structure of CAN-based Network in An Automobile System
when the temperature exceeds the lower threshold, Air Condition then
start to heat by the control of Control Unit .
• Air Condition controlled by Control Unit , can heat and cool the air in
vehicle.
• Driver Door Module can detect if the door of driver position is closed.
When vehicle is starting up and the driver door is not closed properly,
this module will send indication message to Control Unit .
• Oxygen Sensor is a electronic device that measures the exhaust gas
concentration of oxygen for internal combustion engines. Driver can also
use another similar device to measure the partial pressure of oxygen in
their breathing gas. Control Unit could request the current value of oxygen
sensor, and the sensor also sends a warning when oxygen proportion
exceeds some threshold.
In addition to all the devices explained above, there are several other sensors
and actuators with more complex functions in real applications. Furthermore,
one vehicle could have more than one CAN bus systems, and multiple CAN
bus systems are gathered by CAN gateways.
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2.2.1 Hardware Behaviors in The Vehicle Example
It is not rare that there are more than one devices requiring to send messages.
For instances, both Thermal Sensor and Oxygen Sensor require to send
temperature data and oxygen concentration data respectively. Since CAN bus
only allows one message to be transferred at a time, there is a mechanism
provided by hardware to determine which message could be transferred first.
Actually, each message has an associated priority, which is configured in
advance in configuration files. The priority is decided by both the device and
the message type. In our example, temperature and oxygen concentration
are regular application data, but we probably allocate a higher priority to
Oxygen Sensor than Thermal Sensor in configuration files. Hence, Oxygen
Sensor wins in this arbitration. It will take up the CAN bus until the oxygen
concentration data is completed transfered. When Oxygen Sensor finishes
sending, Thermal Sensor can start to send the temperature data or compete
in next round arbitration. It depends if there is any new device requiring to
send data.
The “failure” in the arbitration has to store its message temporarily for further
transmission. In practice, this functionality is provided by CAN controller. The
CANOpen device cannot access to the CAN bus network directly. The CAN
controller acts the role of an interface between the CANOpen device and the
CAN bus. Each CANOpen device has an associated CAN controller. Figure 2.3
illustrates a basic CAN controller block diagram. There are two types of buffers:
one is from CANOpen device to CAN bus referred to as sending buffer; the
other with opposite direction, from CAN bus to CANOpen device is named as
receiving buffer. In our example, when Thermal Sensor fails in the arbitration,
the related temperature message is stored in the sending buffer. As mentioned
above, at any time, there is at most one message in CAN bus. So there is quite
a chance that Driver Door Module needs to send data during other device is
sending the message. The Driver Door Module does not have to wait, and it will
continuously handle the following tasks. The out-going message is stored in
sending buffer as well. When CAN bus is ready for the preceding messages, the
CAN controller then tries to send it out.
CAN bus now supports the highest transmission rate as 1Mbps, which is not
as fast as other network systems today. But considering the price, most of
the microcontrollers of CANOpen devices are not so powerful that there is
probably a delay of processing some of the incoming messages. It is possible
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Figure 2.3: Basic CAN Controller Block Diagram
that all the other devices in Figure 2.2 besides Control Unit have delivered
messages to report data, so the Control Unit cannot process these messages in
time. The receiving buffer related to Control Unit is used to store the messages to
be processed.
Since messages are broadcast in CAN bus, the regular temperature reporting
messages from Thermal Sensor can be detected by all devices in Figure 2.2.
However, only Control Unit in our example is interested in this message.
Because of the limitation of computing capacity of microcontrollers, it is not
considered as a good option that other devices also process this message then
discard it. Generally, a device like Oxygen Sensor does not expect all messages
in the system, and processing unexpected messages is an overhead cost. Thus,
a filter in the CAN controller is designed to blocks unexpected message by
hardware. One could configure the related control of Oxygen Sensor to only
accept messages sent from Control Unit . In this way, other messages including
the regular temperature reporting messages will not be delivered to Oxygen
Sensor .
In summary, the CAN bus provides the message arbitration functionality which
could avoid messages conflict. Buffers provide supports for message collision
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avoidance. In addition, CAN controller also supplies the filtering capability
to stop unnecessary messages consuming device computing resources. Next
section, we will explain how the CANOpen protocol works in the vehicle
example.
2.2.2 CANOpen Behaviors in The Vehicle Example
CANOpen describes a specification to configure and communicate real-time
data as well as the mechanisms for synchronization between CANOpen
devices. The functionalities CANOpen protocol supported can be logically di-
vided over different service objects. Each service object offers a specific function,
such as application data transmission, configuration data transmission and so
on. Furthermore, a complex service may be provided by multiple sub-service
objects.
All these services are classified into two groups, one is the communication service,
the other is control service. As the name indicating, communication service
defines the communication behaviors for CANOpen devices. Before illustrating
the communication service, we will introduce another concept Object Dictionary
(OD) which is important in CANOpen. The Object Dictionary is the heart of any
CANopen device. It is essentially a grouping of objects (parameters) accessible
via the network in an ordered pre-defined fashion[9]. For every node in the
network there exists an OD. The OD contains all parameters describing the
device and its network behavior[10]. For example, the priority configuration
of different messages we talked above is also defined in OD.
According to the different transmission data, communication service includes:
• Service Data Object (SDO): SDO provides the services to access Object
Dictionary. Hence, in the vehicle example, the priority information could
be inquired and informed by the SDO service.
• Process Data Object (PDO): PDO is used to transfer real-time data; data
is transferred from one (and only one) node to one or more nodes. For
instances, the temperature data and oxygen data in our vehicle example
are transferred by the PDO service.
Both SDO and PDO provide supports for data transmission, but for different
data types. They do not fall in the scope of our formal model. [6] can provide
you more technical details about how these two protocols work.
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The object of our model is the control service. Compared to communication
service, control service provides supports for network and system status
managements for CANOpen devices. Before we introduce the control service,
we will show two communication models first, which are commonly used in
CANOpen protocol. It will help us to understand the CANOpen services more
easily.
• Master-Slave Model: At any time, there is exactly one CANOpen device
in the network serving as a master for specific functionality. All other
CANOpen devices in the network are considered as slaves. The master
issues a request to one or more slaves; addressed slave(s) acts(act) as the
protocol defined behaviors. A respond message of master’s request is not
mandatory, depending the specific protocol.
• Producer-Consumer Model: The producer-consumer model is also call
Pull-Push Model, which involves one producer and zero or more
consumer(s). Producer may issue data, and any other devices which are
expecting the data is seen as consumers. The consumer may or may not
confirm of producer’s data.
In the vehicle example, Thermal Sensor sending temperature messages
cyclically is a procuder; the Control Unit is the related consumer. The Control
Unit may or may not send acknowledgements, which is an application-specific
behavior.
With the understanding of these two communication models, we can introduce
the family of control service of CANOpen, which consists of the following sub-
services:
• Synchronization Object (SYNC): The Synchronization protocol uses a
producer/consumer communication coherence. The cyclically transmit-
ted SYNC message indicates to the consumers to start their application-
specific behavior, which is coupled to the reception of the SYNC
message[11].
• Time Stamp Object (TIME): The Time-stamp object is used in order to
adjust the global network time. The Time-stamp producer provides the
current time and all network participants that consume this message
adjust their local clocks according to the received timing data[12].
• Emergency Object (EMCY): The Emergency Object is triggered by the
occurrence of an internal error of the CANOpen device. It adopts the
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producer-consumer communication model.
• Network Management (NMT): Network Management Protocol defines
the network status of a CANOpen device, and it also provides the control
service of the network status of CANOpen devices. NMT follows the
master-slave communication model. The CANOpen devcie controlling
other CANOpen devices acts as the NMT master; CANOpen devices that
are under the control of the master, are called NMT slave. At each time,
there is only one master device in the CAN bus system.
In the vehicle example, if the Thermal Sensor cannot sense the temperature of
the engine, or it detects the engine’s temperature is over a threshold, Thermal
Sensor could use EMCY service to report this abnormal phenomenon. After
receiving the EMCY message, the Control Unit , the consumer of this EMCY
message, could perform the pre-defined acts, such as sending the alarm to the
driver.
With respect to NMT Protocol, the Control Unit could act as the NMT master, so
other devices including the Air Condition are the NMT slaves. It is possible that
the Air Condition caught some internal error, and cannot keep working properly
before manual reset. So the Control Unit can stop the network communication
of the Air Condition, then no more message will be received by or sent from it.
Actually, CANOpen standard consists of many sub-protocols each of which
provide a specific service in CANOpen system. These services are depicted
by high level explanations as well as the low level message representations in
bytes and bits. In addition, the inter-connections between different services are
not explicitly specified in the standard, and some of the services and system
behaviors are not mandatory. These bring more difficulties to build the formal
model.
The formal model addressed in this thesis mainly focuses on the EMCY Service
and NMT Service. We will illustrate the details of how these two protocols work
when we introduce our model. The next chapter will introduce the necessary
knowledge of Maude language, which is used to build the formal model.
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Chapter 3
Equation Logic, Rewrite Logic
and Full Maude
This chapter will give an introduction to the formal modeling method used
in this thesis. Maude was first invented by Jose Meseguer and his group at
the Computer Science Laboratory at SRI International. It is a state-of-the-art
formal tool in the field of algebraic specification, and it is suitable for modeling
of concurrent system[14]. Maude is also a modeling formalism which supports
systematic and explicit working method in analysis and verification.
Additionally, Maude is a descriptive language supporting both equational
and rewriting specifications. A system can be characterized as a combination
of several data, so the static system state can be specified using equational
specifications. On the other hand, dynamic behaviors of a system are defined
by rewrite rules which describe how system states can transit from one to
another in one step. In this way, rewriting logic take equational specifications
as parameters
As a state-of-the-art tool, Maude also supports to model a system in the object-
oriented way. Objects can be naturally specified directly by Maude, but more
widely, we use Full Maude to specify and execute object-oriented systems. Full
Maude is also a specification of Maude which provides syntactic support for
object-oriented concepts such as classes, subclasses, messages, inheritance, etc. In
Full Maude, one can easily build a model supporting multiple inheritance and
asynchronous communication through message passing in a natural way.
This section will only give a brief introduction of equational logic, rewriting
logic and Maude specification, more information can be found in[15].
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3.1 Equational Logic and Rewrite Logic
A rewrite logic has its underlying equational logic as parameters. According
to different equational logic, there are for example, unsorted, many-sorted and
order-sorted versions of rewrite logic. The unsorted signature is the superclass
of many-sorted signature, and the many-sorted signature is also the superclass
of the order-sorted signature.
Sort is a basic definition that should be provided before further discussion. Each
sort relates to a type of data, a set of operators, some of which give notions of
sorts, and some of which are used to specify operations on those sorts, and
equations defining the operators.
In practical usage, it is rarely seen that sorts are not in related anyway. For
example, it is nature to have a sort Int for the integer numbers and a sort NzInt
for the non-zero integer, since zero can not be divisor in division. Under the
many-sorted definition, these two sorts are totally disjoint. We treat sort NzInt
and sort Int as two different sorts without connections. So when we need plus,
subtract and some other functions, it is necessary to give the definition of both
NzInt and Int, which is not a elegant way. This is why we introduce order-
sorted signature.
Definition 1 (Order-sorted signature). An order-sorted signature is a triple(S,
≤, Σ), where S is a set of sorts, ≤ is a partial ordering on S, and Σ is an S* ×
S-sorted family {Σω, s | ω ∈ S*, s ∈ S} of function symbols.
Σω,s is the set of function symbols with arity ω and value sort s. We often write
f : ω → s ∈ Σ for f ∈ Σω,s. If ω is the empty word, then f is often called a
constant (of sort s).
Given an order-sorted signature (S, ≤,Σ), a variable set X is an S-sorted family
X = {Xs | s ∈ S} of pairwise disjoint sets (that is, no variable has two different
sorts: s 6= s′ =⇒ Xs ⋂Xs′ = ∅), also disjoint from Σ (that is, nothing can be
both a variable and a function symbol). We will often write x : s for x ∈ Xs. To
model a system, we use the following definition term to express the states of
the system.
Definition 2 (Terms in order-sorted signatures). Given an order-sorted signa-
ture, (S, ≤,Σ) and a variable set X = {Xs | s ∈ S}, the S-sorted set of terms T Σ(X)
= {T Σ,s(X) | s ∈ S} is defined inductively by the following conditions:
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1. Xs ⊆ T Σ,s(X) for s ∈ S; that is, a variable of sort s is also a term of sort s.
2. Σω,s ⊆ T Σ,s(X) for s ∈ S; that is, a constant of sort is also a term of sort s.
3. f (t1, ..., tn) ∈ T Σ, s(X) if f ∈ Σs1...sn,s and ti ∈ TΣ,si (X) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
4. TΣ,s′(X) ⊆ TΣ,s(X) if s′ ≤ s; that is, a term in a subsort s’ is also a term of
the supersort s.
5. TΣ(X) is the smallest S-sorted set satisfying the above conditions.
Definition 3 (Equations). Given an order-sorted signature (S,≤,Σ), a (Σ−)
equation is a triple (X, t, t’), written (∀X) t = t’, where X is an S-sorted variable
set disjoint from Σ, and t and t’ are terms of the same sort; i.e., t, t’ ∈ T±,∫ (X) for
some s ∈ S.
A conditional (Σ−) equation is a 2(n + 1) + 1−tuple (X, u1, v1, ..., un, vn, t, t′)
for n ≥ 1, written
(∀X)u1 = v1 ∧ ..∧ un = vn =⇒ t = t′,
such that there are sorts s1, ..., sn, sinSwitht, t′ ∈ TΣ,s(X) and ui, vi ∈ TΣ,si(X) for
each i ∈ {1, .., n}.
Definition 4 (Order-sorted equational specifications). An order-sorted equa-
tional specification is an order-sorted signature (S,≤,Σ) and a set E of a (Σ−)
equations and conditional (Σ−) equations.
Now we have the definition of equational specification, which is necessary for
the notion of rewrite logic.
Definition 5 (Rewriting logic specification). A rewriting logic specification
(also called a rewrite theory) is a tupleR = (Ω, E, L, R) where Ω is an algebraic
signature (which in the order-sorted case would have the form Ω = (S,≤,Σ)),
E is a set of equations, L is a set of labels, and R is a set of unconditional labeled
rewrite rules written.
l : t −→ t′
and conditional labeled rewrite rules of the form
l : t −→ t′ if cond
where l ∈ L, t and t’ are terms in TΣ(X), and cond is a conjunction of rewrite
conditions of the form u −→ u′, equation conditions of the form v = v′ and
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membership conditions w : s, for u, u′, v, v′, w terms in TΣ(X) and s a sort in Σ.
3.2 Maude Specification
This section describes how to specify data types, equational logic and rewriting
logic in Maude.
There are several benefits of using Maude for modeling. Compared to
imperative languages such as Java and C++, it has the following advantages:
• Maude code is much easier to be understood, since it is closer to human
language and contains no elusive terminologies, reference, for loop or
memory address.
• Maude code is a program and also a specification. After translating
protocol or system description into Maude specification, we directly get a
executable program.
• Maude is a formalism based on algebraic, so a Maude model has
mathematical meanings. We can reason a Maude model easily by
following mathematical rules. If we need to prove a desired property of a
system, we do not have to enumerate all possible instances.
• Maude has built-in analyzing tools, which can be used in system analysis
on a formal model.
3.2.1 Equational Logic Specification in Maude
In Maude, an equational specification is a functional module which is defined
with the follow syntax:
fmod MODULENAME is
BODY
endfm
where the MODULENAME is the name of the module being defined, and
BODY is a set of declarations of sorts, function symbols, variables and
euqations.
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In the following part of this subsection, We will first show a simple example of
Maude functional model. With respect to this model, we will illustrate how to
represent sort, order-sorted relationship, functions, variables and equations in
Maude.
fmod INTEGER is
protecting BOOLEAN .
sorts Zero NzNat NzNeg Nat Neg Int .
subsorts Zero < Nat Neg < Int .
subsort NzNat < Nat .
subsort NzNeg < Neg .
op 0 : → Nat [ctor] .
op s : Nat → NzNat [ctor] .
ops _−_ _+_ : Int Int → Int .
op _/_ : Nat NzNat → Nat .
var NN : NzNat .
vars N N2 : Nat .
eq 0 + N = N .
eq s(N) + N2 = s(N + N2) .
endfm
The first line in the module body is importing another module named
BOOLEAN into the current module. The imported model may be Maude
predefined or user defined. Maude has several predefined modules. Some of
them provide the basic data type such as integer, string, boolean, and some of
provide support of composited data type like set, list. Before one starts to use
these data types in a module, one nas to explicitly import them.
Key word sorts is used for defining two or more sorts in Maude. After
defining data types, one can specify order-sorted relation of these data types
by keywords subsort or subsorts.
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The function definition is denoted by a starting key word op or ops. All the
function symbols have the similar form:
op f : s1 ... sn → s .
or
ops f g h : s1 ... sn → s .
for n ≥ 0, where f g h are introduced as function symbols, s1, ..., sn and s are
sorts. The list s1 ... sn is called arity, and s is the value sort of these functions.
In the following part of this thesis, we use function, function symbol, operator and
operator symbol interchangeably. In the example above, the underscore “_” in-
dicates the position of the member in arity. There are also functions taking no
arity. Typically, this kind of function defines constant of a specific sort with an
attribute attr in the end of the function. In addition, the function symbol is not
always explicitly denoted, as the example below
op __ : List Nat→ List [ctor] .
where it means a list catenating with a nature is still a list.
In Maude key words var and vars are used to declare variables. In the example
above, NN, N and N2 are the variable names, and NzNat and Nat are the
corresponding sorts defined before.
The last part of our example shows how to define equational logic specifications
in Maude. Similar to high-level programing languages, op declare a function
and key word eq defines the behavior of a function. The equations in the ex-
ample have the same format as
eq t = t´ .
where both t and t´ are terms. There is another kind of equation named condi-
tional equation with the format as
ceq t = t´ if u1 = v1 ∧ ...∧ un = vn .
where ui and vi (i = 1 ... n) are all terms. By this way, the equation eq 0 + N
= N . can also be defined as ceq 0 + N = N if true . where true is a constant
defined in module BOOLEAN.
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3.2.2 Rewriting Logic Specification in Maude
The equation logic is used to specify the static state of a system. But there
is hardly a system which is static without any state transitions. We could
characterize a person as an object with attributes name, marry_status and age.
The age of the person continuously increases as the time goes by. The name
of the person and the marriage status of the person may also be changed. To
describe a dynamic system or object by a model, we need a way to reflect the
changes.
The problem of using equational logic specification to simulate status trans-
itions is the symmetry property. For instance, we model a person with only
name and age. It it nature that the person gets older in logic
person(“Vein”, 39) = person(“Vein”, 40)
Because of symmetry property, this equation could also be reversed mathemat-
ically.
person(“Vein”, 39) = person(“Vein”, 40)
However, this does not make any sense in reality, since no one could become
younger. Hence, we could use rewriting logic specification to describe
behaviors like this.
Definition 6 (Rewriting logic specification). A rewriting logic specification
(also called a rewrite theory) is a tuple R = (Ω, E, L, R) where Ω is
an algebraic signature (which in the order-sorted case would have the form
Ω = (S, ≤, Σ)), E is a set of equations and membership axioms, L is a set of
labels, and R is a set of unconditional labeled rewrite rules written
l : t −→ t′
and conditional labeled rewrite rules of the form
l : t −→ t′ i f cond
where l ∈ L, t and t′ are terms in TΩ(X), and cond is a conjunction of rewrite
conditions of the form u −→ u′, equational conditions of the form v = v′ and
membership conditons w : s, for u, u′, v, v′, w terms in TΩ(X) and s a sort in Ω.
With rewriting logical specification, we can simulate the age changing of a
person by form
person(Vein, 39) −→ person(Vein, 40)
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Intuitively, the−→ denotes the transition can only happen from left side to right
side. This is a significant difference from equational logic specification.
A rewriting logic is defined in the system module in Maude. When we introduce
equational logic in Maude, equational specifications are represented in the
functional module. A system module is similar to a function module with the
exception that keywords fmod and endfm are replaced by keywords mod and
endm. Rewrite rules are defined as the form
rl [l] : t⇒ t′ .
and
crl [l] : t⇒ t′ i f cond .
in the conditional case. Thus, we can write the above age changing as a rewrite
rule like
crl [birthday] : person(S, N) −→ person(S, s(N)) .
where S is a variable with String sort and N is a variable with Nat sort.
Considering the reality, a condition can be added to this rule
crl [birthday] : person(S, N) −→ person(S, s(N)) i f N < 200 .
since no one exceeds 200 years old.
When Maude executes rewriting rules, there are 2 properties needed to be
mentioned:
• Nondeterminism means even with the same initial state, the final result
might be different after applying rewrite rules. This is because there
could be more than one rewrite rules matching whose left side matches
the current system states, and Maude will chose one of them randomly.
• Nontermination In reality, not all systems are designed to have a termina-
tion, such as bank ATM machine. When an ATM finishes the service of
one, it is supposed to keep waiting for the next user instead of stopping
service. Reflecting the actual behaviors of a system, the resulting model
should not be terminated unless we stop it manually. Analyzing the non-
terminating models may require some extra attribute constraints to limit
the execution times, we will explain more in Chapter 4.
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3.3 Full Maude
Maude is a very powerful formalism for distributed systems and communica-
tion protocol. It is naturally to model a distributed system or a communication
protocol with the notion of objects and messages. All the objects and messages
together constitute a global system. The core Maude provides one way of mod-
eling an object as the term
< o : C | att1 : val1, ..., attn : valn > .
which indicates an object of class C whose name or identifier is o and attributes are
att1 to att2 with values val1 to valn respectively. With this term, we could model
a person using the following form:
< “Vein′′ : Person | age : 28, ..., status : single > .
To use this term, we need define a function symbol
op < _ : C | att1 : _, ..., attn : _ > : Oid s1 ... sn → Object [ctor] .
where C is a class, Object is a sort and s1 to sn are the sorts of att1 to attn. So the
class Person can be defined
sorts Object Oid .
subsort String Oid .
op < _ : Person | age : _, status : _ > :
Oid Nat Status→ Object [ctor].
Although it is natural to model object-oriented specifications in Maude, users
would always have more expectations for Maude to support object-oriented
syntax such as class, message and class inheritance through subclass directly.
Maude is supposed to provide exactly this kind of support for object-oriented
specification in the future. For now, we have Full Maude to specify and execute
object-oriented systems..
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Full Maude is a prototype of Maude’s support for object-oriented specification
and for its operations on modules and module parameterization[16]. It can
reduce the programing codes of specifying rewrite rules.
We have a new module named object-oriented module which has the syntax as
follows
(omod M is ... endom)
To declare a class, we have the syntax in Full Maude where the sequence of
attributes does not affect the class.
class C | att1 : s1, ..., attn : sn .
Let two classes C and C’ be
class C | att1 : s1, ..., attn : sn .
and
class C′ | att′1 : s′1, ..., att′n : s′n .
respectively. We could define C as a subclass of C’ using the form subclass
C < C′ to indicate that each object of C class is also an object of C’ class.
For communication between objects, Full Maude also defines the syntax
msg f : s1, ..., sn → Msg .
to define sort Msg. Both class and Msg are subclasses of Configuration, a
predefined sort in Maude.
With the notions of Msg, class and Configuration, a distributed system can be
defined as “soup” consisted of different kinds of classes and messages. The
“soup” itself also has the sort of Configuration.
op __ : Configuration Configuration →
Configuration [ctor assoc comm id: none] .
In the above function declaration, in addition to property ctor, there are also
three other properties. assoc means associativity, comm is the abbreviation of
commutativity and none is a constant of sort Configuration having the similar
meaning as null in programing language C which denotes an ‘empty’ sort
Configuration.
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3.4 Analysis Method in Maude
Constructing a model is only the first step, the final goal is what we can derive
from the model. Thus, there must be ways to analyze the model and evaluate
the result. The checking procedure can be performed by Maude automatically,
as long as a desired property is explicitly specified.
Maude supports a wide range of formal analysis methods, including rewrite for
simulating system behaviors, search and narrowing[17] for reachability problem,
linear temporal model checking[18] for temporal logic properties and so on. We
will take a deep look into rewrite and search methods which are used in the
thesis.
3.4.1 Execution
Maude has a basic command red taking a term t as the input red t to reduce
the given term t into a normal form. Intuitively, the procedure of reduction is
applying equation specifications on a term. A normal form of a term t is to reduce
t 0 or more times until there is no reduction can be taken. For a specification
E, if each term can be reduced into its normal form, then we can say that the
specification E is terminating.
There is also another essential property of a specification E which needs our
attentions when we build a model. For a given term t, there may be more
than one equation specifications can be applied for reduction. Furthermore,
if a specification E is termination, then there probably exist one or more normal
forms for a term t, depending on the equation specifications and the sequence
of them we choose. Hence, we define a specification E is confluent if and only if
for any term t, it has a unique normal form.
Maude does not check the termination and confluence properties of a model,
so we have to make sure our models are terminated and confluent when we
construct it. Otherwise, you cannot expect Maude give a satisfied result out.
This article does not cover the methods to build a confluent and terminated
model, you can get more information in [14].
The Maude commands rew and frew are used to simulate the possible behaviors
of a system by applying rewrite rules from an initial state: rew [n] init and frew
[n] init where init is a term denoting the system initial state and “[n]”, as an
optional parameter, means how many rewrite steps do you intend to perform.
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In the previous ‘Person’ example, if “Vein” is still single and 28 years old and
we need to check what will “Vein” become by applying 20 steps of rewrite, we
can run the command
rew [20] < “Vien” : Person | age : 20, status : Single > .
There is one thing you should keep in mind that when you define rewrite rules
in Maude, the left side must be a normal form. This is because before Maude
perform rewrite rules on a given term, it will reduce the term to normal form
first. It is not as “intelligent” as us that can tell if a reduced term matches
another term which is not in its normal form.
3.4.2 Reachability Analysis
Search uses a breadth-first strategy to explore all possible behaviors from a given
initial state. We use the following syntax for an unconditional search
search init arrow pattern .
and the syntax for a conditional search
search init arrow pattern such that cond .
where init is the term of initial state, pattern denotes the term of desired system
state and cond indicate the search condition. There are four possible forms of
the arrow, and each of them has different meanings:
• ⇒1: states which can be reached in exact one step
• ⇒*: states which can be reached in zero or more steps
• ⇒+: states which can be reached in one or more steps
• ⇒!: states which can not be further rewritten
Search tries to find all the possible results matching the pattern under the
specified condition. But sometimes the number of results is infinite. If so, the
search command will keep running without halt. Besides, not all specification
are supposed to be terminating, so Maude define two other parameters with
search command.
One can assign an upper bound n on the search results by the syntax
search [n] ... .
and set an upper bound d on rewrite steps by the syntax
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search [,d] ... .
since Maude uses bread-first way as the search pattern. Of course, one can set
these two upper bounds at the same time
search [n,d] ... .
In the thesis, we verify the soundness of the CANOpen protocol to see if there
is any unexpected state existing in CANOpen systems. Given an initial state
of a system, we will mostly use the reachability analysis method to check if the
system could enter into a state which is not specified in the CANOpen protocol.
In addition, we use frew and frew commands to demonstrate that our model
could execute properly.
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Part II
Modeling and Analysis
33

Chapter 4
Technical Details of CANOpen
System and Formal Model of the
CANOpen Communication
Protocol
Chapter 2 gives the high-level description of CAN bus and CANOpen protocol
using a vehicle example; chapter 3 introduces the basic knowledge of Maude
used to build the formal model. In this chapter, we will explain the concerned
details of CANOpen protocol and the CAN bus , along with which, we will also
show how to formalize these details by Maude.
Requirements and specifications describing a protocol or system are the
foundations of constructing a model. The actual model-building procedure
is to translate the requirements and specifications into model language. One
problem of the translation is that, CANOpen is a very complex communication
protocol, and there are many services composing the protocol. For most of these
services, there are also some optional behaviors which are not mandatory. So
the protocol has a large configuration space. In the other hand, the interactions
between different services are not completely covered by the standard CiA301.
In addition to high-level specification of the explicit behaviors of CANOpen
devices, CAN bus standard and the CANOpen protocol also contain many
details in bit-wise level. This also makes the protocol complicated.
Modeling of a complex communication system like this is a big challenge.
Because of the time limitations, we cannot simulate every service in the
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protocol. We have to choose the modeling parts where potential problems
might exist. Another difficulty is to abstract the system in a proper level without
too much details. Meanwhile, the abstract will not negatively affect the analysis
result.
Our model mainly focuses on parts of the underlying-layer services of CAN bus
system and parts of the control services of CANOpen protocol. The underlying-
layer services include the priority arbitration of the CAN bus and the message
filtering and buffering of the CAN controller; the control services in the model
covers the NMT protocol and the EMCY protocol of CANOpen. The rest parts
of CANOpen such as SDO, PDO, TIME Objects and SYNC Objects are not parts
of our model. Choosing to model the EMCY protocol and NMT protocol instead
of others is because they manage the application internal state and the network
state of the CANOpen device. They impact and decide the behaviors of other
services. Another reason is that DNV GL also finds some issues in control
service. There is supposed to be more possible issues. In our model, we ignore
all of the low-level bit-wise details and simplifies some complex behaviors. The
model building stays true to the CANOpen standard[6] without any implicit
assumption.
4.1 Underlying-layer Behaviors of The CANOpen Sytem
Instead of introducing the underlying-layer behaviors in a high-level fashion in
chapter 2, we will in this chapter consider the details about how they work and
how they are represented in Maude.
4.1.1 CAN Controller
Chapter 2 introduces two important features filtering and buffering in the CAN
bus communication provided by the CAN controller. In this section, we will
describe the details about these two functionalities and how we model them
by Maude. Even though our objective is to formalize CANOpen, we need to
include CAN bus in the formalization in order to capture the feature of message
transmission in CANOpen system.
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4.1.1.1 Buffer
Buffers provide supports of buffering both incoming and outgoing messages.
But the mechanism about how the buffers work is not included in the
CANOpen protocol or the CAN bus specification. In practice, the mechanism
is adopted and implemented by the manufactures of CAN controllers. Because
of the cost, a CAN Controller typically has a limited number of buffers. So the
essence of a buffering mechanism is how to push new messages into and pop
old messages out of a buffer. For an industry production, it usually takes one
of the following mechanisms:
• FIFO: First-In-First-Out(FIFO) is a directive and basic way. There are 2
buffers in the controller which can store multiple messages. Outgoing
messages are stored in the sending queue in the order of their generations
in the microcontroller. When CAN bus is ready for the next round
transmission, the first message in the queue will be sent out. Likewise,
incoming messages through filter are also stored in the sequence of being
delivered from the bus. CANOpen device will fetch and process the first
message in the receiving buffer queue. If the buffer is full, new messages
are going to be discarded. By FIFO mechanism, a high priority message
will need to wait until all preceding messages are processed. This is not in
accordance with the intention of high priority messages first. Even worse,
under the some circumstances, if buffers are full, high priority messages
could be discarded directly. Consequently, these message will never be
send out or delivered.
• High Priority First: Since some messages are so crucial like reporting
fatal errors that they should be offered high guarantees to be not lost,
high priority first schema is adopted by some manufactures. As the name
suggests, messages in the queue with high priorities will be processed
first. Moreover, when buffers are full, new messages with higher priority
than any of messages in the buffer will replace the message with lowest
priority. This schema solves the problem caught in FIFO, but it also brings
more control complexity.
• Full-CAN: The early CAN controller used the so-called "Full-CAN"
implementation. Full-CAN controllers have a number of messages objects,
each of which has only one buffer for one message. Each message object
is bi-directional(can be configured to either sending or receiving), and
each is associated with one filter. This allows us to configure the message
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object to accept only one specific message. The Full-CAN controller is
very efficient as long as the number of messages the CANOpen device
expecting is small. With the increasement of the scale of the CAN-based
system, more messages are expected to be received. So there is no true
benefit of Full-CAN controllers. In the vehicle example of Figure 2.2,
Control Unit may listen to all messages from other devices, so it needs
a great amount of message objects. Moreover, in a back-to-back scenario,
each message object owns a single buffer and matching incoming message
will override the buffer’s content.
• Advanced: An improvement of the CAN controller solution is a
combination of Full-CAN controller and FIFO(or high priority first).
Instead of storing only one message, each message object has the capacity
of multiple messages. Although powerful, it requires the most complex
control mechanism.
In our model, we adopt the FIFO mechanism for buffers. The buffer is modeled
by the sort Que, and the sort NeQue indicates a non-empty buffer. To insert and
remove messages from the buffer, we define two equation rules named addTo
and pop respectively.
sorts NeQue Que .
subsorts NeQue < Que .
op _addTo_ : X$Elt Que -> Que .
eq E addTo Q = Q : E .
op pop : Que -> Que .
eq pop(nilQue) = nilQue .
eq pop(E) = nilQue .
eq pop(E : NEQ) = NEQ .
nilQue is the constant representing an empty buffer. E, Q and NEQ are
all variables which represent an element, a buffer and a non-empty buffer
respectively. addTo ensures the new message is inserted to the end of the
buffer; pop removes the first message of the buffer. It complies with the FIFO
mechanism.
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4.1.1.2 Filter
A filter is designed to block unexpected messages. To filter message, two types
of registers are related. One is mask register, ignoring some of bits; the other is
match register only allowing matched messages to come through. A bit being 1
at mask register will enable comparison between the bit of the match register
and received message in the corresponding positions. A bit being 0 at mask
register means it does not matter what is the corresponding bit in message data.
We use the example in Figure 4.1 to explain how the mask and match registers
work. The combination of mask registers and match registers is effective, and
it could percolate most of unexpected messages and alleviate the pressure of
microncontrollers.
Figure 4.1: A Simple Example of Filter Work Flow
The filtering is an auxiliary function in CANOpen communication network,
and the purpose of a filter is to percolate unnecessary messages. So we
simplifies the filtering procedure. In stead of implementing the mask and match
registers function, we define an equation:
op _percolate_ : NatSet Nat -> Bool .
eq nilSet percolate N = false .
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eq (N NS) percolate N2 = if N == N2 then true
else (NS percolate N2)
fi .
NS is a set of natural number; N and N2 are both natural number. We configure
all expected COB-IDs in the set. If the COD-ID of the incoming message is in
the set, this message will be delivered to the related microcontroller. Otherwise,
it will be discarded.
4.1.1.3 Model CAN Controller
With the model of filtering and buffering functionalities, we can model a CAN
controller as follows:
class Controller | txbuf : Que , rxbuf : Que ,
filter : NatSet , rxbufCap : Nat ,
txbufCap : Nat .
where txbuf indicates the outgoing messages buffer, rxbuf indicates the
incoming messages buffer, filter is a set containing COB-IDs of all expected
messages, rxbufCap indicates the size of the rxbuf and txbufCap indicates the
size of the txbuf.
The behaviors of the CAN controller include frames transceiving between CAN
bus and CANOpen device. We will show some of the Maude codes about the
CAN controller behaviors after CAN bus model is introduced.
4.1.2 Priority Arbitration
The priority arbitration is a important functionality provided by CAN bus. It is
the foundation base on which all communications in a CANOpen system can
work properly. Before we take a deep look at priority arbitration, a few other
technique details should be illustrated first.
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4.1.2.1 CAN Frame
In a CANOpen system, each CANOpen device is configured with a unique
identifier referred to as node ID, which is 7-bits length. Thus, in a single CAN
bus, there are at most 128 nodes. An extension of CAN bus standard allows
longer bits node ID, so that more devices can connect to a CAN bus system. But
in practice, CAN-based systems using an extension are rarely seen, so we adopt
the 7-bits node ID. Figure 4.2 indicates a general basic CAN frame. Typically, a
CAN frame is composed of control data and payload. Control data has a fixed
length, and payload has flexible length between 0 to 8 bytes. In Figure 4.2, we
only describe parts of the control data, since others are not related to the further
model and analysis.
Componet
Length
COB-ID RTR Data Length Data
11 bits 1 bit 4 bits 0 - 8 bytes
Figure 4.2: Basic CAN Frame Structure
• COB-ID: Communication Object Identifier(COB-ID) is used to identify one
message. It could also be seen as the message ID. Different COB-IDs
represent different messages, and a message with smaller COB-ID has
higher priority. Message priority is decided by two parts: message
type and the sending device node ID. Messages in CAN-based system
are classified, and each type of message is used to transfer a specific
information. Before devices can start to communicate, every type message
is assigned to a 4 bits function code. For example, in Figure 2.2, the Thermal
Sensor with node ID 40h is supposed to report temperature data toControl
Unit . The vehicle system is configured to use function code Bh to indicate
this type of message. So the COB-ID of this message is B40h. That is, the
first number denotes function code, and the last two numbers denote node
ID.
• RTR: In the vehicle example, the Thermal Sensor can report temperatures
actively driven by time. Additionally, the Control Unit could also request
the Thermal Sensor to send temperature data. In CAN bus system,
messages requested data are called Remote Transmission Request(RTR). The
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flag RTR in a CAN frame is used to denote if this message is a request or
response.
• Data Length: Data length indicates the length of payload in the message.
Since a CAN frame can only contain at most 8-bytes data, we only need
four bits to record the data length.
• Data: Data field is the payload of a CAN frame. The payload is empty
for a RTR message. The content of the payload might be application
level data such as temperature and oxygen concentration, or system
configuration data.
A CAN bus frame is modeled by a Maude class simply as
class Frame | id : Nat , other : FrameData .
where the attribute id represents the COB-ID and the attribute other indicates
other parts of a CAN frame. FrameData is a predefined sort type, which is a
supperclass and will be inherited by other classes. We abstract the real CAN
frame into two attributes, which avoids the redundancies such as Data Length.
4.1.2.2 CAN Bus
Our model does not require or rely any physical features of the CAN bus. So
the model of CAN bus is more like a “logic device” which records the condition
of the underlying communication network. The class in our model to model
CAN bus is also very simple with only two attributes,
class Bus | status : BusStatus , owner : Oid .
where attribute owner denotes the node which is occupying the bus to transfer
data and attribute status denotes the current state of the bus. Oid is a
Full-Maude predefined sort representing the object ID. BusStatus defines all
possible states the CAN bus could stay in:
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• free: No message is currently in the bus and no node intends to send a
message.
• started: There are more than one nodes need to send message at the same
time. So the bus is going to start a arbitration.
• arbitrated: The bus has “chosen” the winner in the arbitration, and the
arbitration procedure is over.
• transmitting: The “winner” starts to transmit the message, but the last bit
of the message is not delivered yet.
• transmitted: The message transmission finishes, and the bus is going back
to free again.
4.1.2.3 CAN Bus States Transition
Figure 4.3 shows the states transition of CAN bus.
Figure 4.3: CAN Bus States Transition
1. When the CAN bus is free, any CANOpen device could use the bus to
transfer data. The bus will remain in free state if no device needs to
transfer data. If one or more devices are going to send messages, the CAN
bus then enters into started state.
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2. In the started state, a decision that which node can take up the CAN bus is
made. If there is only node requiring to send data, the started state is over.
The node will start to send the data and the CAN bus goes into arbitrated
state. If there are more then one nodes having messages to transfer, then
an arbitration procedure starts. Finally, when the node with the message
of highest priority is selected, the bus enters into the arbitrated state.
3. The CAN bus will automatically enter into the transmitting state.
4. When the last bit of the message is delivered, the CAN bus enters into the
transmitted state.
5. The CAN bus in transmitted state can automatically become free, where no
node is occupying the bus.
We use a rewrite rule to model the transition 1 in Figure 4.3:
rl[startArbitration] :
GLOBAL(< BID : Bus | owner : nilOid , status : free >
< CID : Controller | txbuf : NEBUF >
CONF)
=>
GLOBAL( arbitrate (
< BID : Bus | status : started >
< CID : Controller | >
CONF) ) .
The left side of the rule denotes that if the CAN bus is in free state and there
is at least on CAN controller with an non-empty txbuf, then the bus starts an
arbitration procedure.
The CAN bus state transition 2 is modeled by a Maude operation arbitrate.
We we describe the CAN bus arbitration and the operation in next section.
We model the CAN bus state transition 3 using another rewriting rule:
rl[transmitMsg] :
GLOBAL (
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< CID : Controller | txbuf : (< FID : Frame |
id : COD , other : DATA > : BUF) >
< BID : Bus | owner : CID , status : arbitrated >
CONF )
=>
GLOBAL (
< CID : Controller | txbuf : BUF >
broadcast (DATA withID COD from CID) in (
< BID : Bus | status : transmitting >
CONF) ) .
In the left side, the CAN bus state arbitrated indicates that the arbitration is
over. The attribute owner denotes the ID of the CAN controller which can take
up the CAN bus. In the right side of this rule, the controller broadcasts its
message and the CAN bus state changes into transmitting.
The operation broadcast in the above rule triggers the CAN bus state transition
4. The operation and related equations are defined as follows:
op broadcast_in_ : Msg Configuration -> Configuration
[format (n nt n nt n)] .
eq broadcast (DATA withID COD from CID) in (< CID :
Controller | > CONF)
=
< CID : Controller | > (broadcast (DATA withID COD
from CID) in CONF) .
eq broadcast (DATA withID COD from CID) in ( < BID :
Bus | status : transmitting , owner : CID > )
=
< BID : Bus | status : transmitted , owner : nilOid >
.
eq broadcast (DATA withID COD from CID) in ( < CID2 :
Controller | > < BID : Bus | owner : CID , status :
transmitting > CONF )
=
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(deliver (DATA withID COD from CID) to < CID2 :
Controller | >) broadcast (DATA withID COD from
CID) in ( CONF < BID : Bus | >) [owise] .
As the name suggests, this operation tries to broadcast one message to the
global CANOpen system. The first equation indicates that the message is only
delivered to all other CAN controllers except for the sender. The left side of the
second equation indicates that all controllers have received the message. So the
message broadcasting is over, and the CAN bus state enters into transmitted.
Meanwhile, the attribute owner of CAN bus becomes nilOid which denotes
no device is occupying the bus. The last equation describes that, the message
is delivered to one CAN controller in the global system, and the broadcasting
continues in the rest of the CANOpen system.
The last transition of CAN bus states is modeled by a simple rule:
rl[backToIdle] :
GLOBAL (
< BID : Bus | owner : nilOid , status :
transmitted > CONF)
=>
GLOBAL (< BID : Bus | status : free > CONF) .
which means the CAN bus will automatically switches into free state from
transmitted state.
4.1.2.4 Priority Arbitration
In chapter 2, we have showed that there will be a collision when both Thermal
Sensor and Oxygen Sensor having messages to sent. To solve this problem,
CAN bus defines the priority which can be fully decided by COB-ID. Messages
conflicts solving is one of the core features in CAN. It ensures that higher
priority messages will always be delivered first, so no bandwidth is lost.
Since a lower COB-ID has a higher priority, the message with the smallest
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COB-ID could win in the arbitration. All COB-IDs are compared bit by bit
from left to right, the highest significant bit first. With the Figure 2.2, we still
use the vehicle example to illustrate arbitration procedure. We assign node
IDs 1000000b, 1100000b and 0111000b to Thermal Sensor , Driver Door Module
and Oxygen Sensor respectively. These three devices transfers corresponding
application data by the same type of message with the function code 1110b. So
the three message COD-IDs are listed as in Figure 4.4. The first four bits are
equal since they are the same type message. We begin to compare the 7 bits
node ID. Obviously, 0 is smaller than 1, so Oxygen Sensor win the chance to
transfer data.
Figure 4.4: Example of COB-IDs Comparison
Actually, binary 0 and 1 map to different voltage in the bus. 0 corresponds
to the dominant[19] voltage and 1 corresponds to the recessive[19] voltage. First,
devices try to send the highest bits of their COD-IDs. The devices with dominant
bit can continue the next round comparison. If all bits are recessive, no device
will be eliminated. The winers in the last round bit comparison then try to
send the second highest bits, and the comparison procedure is the same. The
arbitration will not stop until there is only one winer left.
We model the arbitration procedure by operation arbitrate, which also
triggers the CAN bus state transition 2 in Figure 4.3.
op arbitrate_ : Configuration -> Configuration [format
(n d n)] .
47
Although this function has the name “arbitrate”, it does not always start an
arbitration in the formal model. In fact, if there is only one node with messages
to send, the CAN bus enters into arbitrated state directly and the node will be
the owner of the bus.
eq arbitrate ( < CID : Controller | txbuf : NEBUF > <
BID : Bus | status : started > )
=
< CID : Controller | > < BID : Bus | status :
arbitrated , owner : CID > .
If there are multiple controllers with messages to send, the arbitration will take
two of them and check the priority. The one with higher priority will stat for
another comparison with other controllers. The “failure” is eliminated out of
the arbitration.
eq arbitrate ( < CID : Controller | txbuf : (FRAM :
BUF) > < CID2 : Controller | txbuf : (FRAM2 : BUF2)
> < BID : Bus | status : started CONF >
=
if (FRAM prior FRAM2)
then
< CID2 : Controller | > arbitrate (< CID : Controller |
> < BID : Bus | > CONF)
else
< CID : Controller | > arbitrate (< CID2 : Controller |
> < BID : Bus | > CONF)
fi.
A controller without messages to transfer will be removed from this arbitration
directly.
eq arbitrate (< CID : Controller | txbuf : nilQue > <
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BID : Bus | status : started > CONF)
=
< CID : Controller | > arbitrate (< BID : Bus | > CONF)
.
In addition, we also have some other rules and functions to model the CAN bus
and the CAN controller behaviors.
4.2 The Control Services
CANOpen is not only a communication protocol but also an application layer
profile, so data transmission is only a part of the specification. Compared to
data transmission, control services especially network and application states
controls are more complex. Thus, there are more possibilities to encounter
exceptions in control services. This is why our model mainly focuses on the
EMCY service and the NMT service.
4.2.1 The EMCY Service
EMCY service is used to manage the application inner states. The CANOpen
protocol defines two emergency states:
• error free: Error free indicates that no application internal error exists in
the CANOpen device.
• error occurred: Error occurred indicates that there are application internal
errors happened, and the errors are not resolved yet.
Figure 4.5 depicts the application internal states transition of a CANOpen
device. We label each transition with a number from 0 to 5, and explain all
these transition as follows:
0. After initialization, the CANOpen device enters the error free state if no
error is detected. No EMCY object is sent out.
1. The CANOpen device detects an internal error indicated in the first three
bytes of the emergency message. The CANOpen device enters into the
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Figure 4.5: Error States Transition
error occurred state. An EMCY object with the appropriate error code is
transmitted.
2. One of the previous errors, but not all of them, is resolved. An emergency
message containing error code 0000h(This is the error reset message) may
be transmitted together with the remaining errors.
3. A new error occurs on the CANOpen device. The CANOpen device
remains in the error occurred state and transmits an EMCY object with the
appropriate error code. The new error code is filled in at the top of the
array of error codes. It shall be guaranteed that the error codes are sorted
in a timely manner.
4. All error reasons are gone. The CANOpen device switches back to the
error free state and transmits an EMCY object with the error code error
reset/no error.
5. CANOpen device is reset or power-off.
The rest part of this section shows how we model the EMCY protocol by Maude.
Not every part of the model concerning the EMCY protocol will be listed. We
model a device with EMCY service with the class as below:
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class Node | ID : Nat , emcyRole : EmcyRole , errNo :
Nat , errs : EmcyErrNameSet , nodeState :
NodeStatus , emcyRecord : EmcyRecords .
where ID is the ID of the device in the CAN bus network. Since there is at
most 128 nodes in a CAN system, the ID is natural number less than 128.
Furthermore, there are not any two Nodes with the same ID. The attribute
emcyRole denotes if the node is the EMCY message producer or the EMCY
message consumer. The attribute errNo is the number of internal errors
occurred and not resolved, and errs records all these errors. The attribute
nodeState indicates if the node is error free or error occurred. The last attribute
emcyRecord is for EMCY message consumer only, which records all the errors
reported by EMCY message producer.
We use the following rule to model an EMCY message producer catches an
application internal error and generate an EMCY message.
rl[nodeErrorOccur] :
< O : ErrType | validErrName : EED S >
< NodeO : Node | emcyRole : EmcyP , ID : IDN , errNo : N,
errs : S2 >
=>
< NodeO : Node | errNo : s(N), errs : S2 EED ,
nodeState : errorOccured >
< O : ErrType | >
(Emergency eecerr withDesc EED from IDN) .
In the above rule, the object O is an instance of class ErrType which defines the
possible application internal error names. The node NodeO catches then error
named EED, which is a constant of possible error reasons. This node generates
an emergency message (Emergency eecerr withDesc EED from IDN) which is
a subclass of FrameData to report its internal error. So it can be encapsulated
within the class Frame which models a CAN bus frame. This message is
also a type of Msg which is an pre-defined object in Full Maude. Besides the
error reason EED, the message contains the node ID IDN of the producer. In
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addition, the producer increases its errNO, and records the new error reason in
its attribute errs. No matter what the previous EMCY state of the node is, its
current state will be errorOccured.
The EMCY consumer which expects the EMCY message from node NodeO will
record the necessary information when the message is delivered. The following
rule models the operations of the EMCY consumer.
rl[emcyErrorConsumed] :
< NodeO : Node | emcyRole : EmcyC , emcyRecord : ERS >
(Emergency eecerr withDesc EED from IDN)
=>
< NodeO : Node | emcyRecord : ERS (node IDN caughtErr
EED) > .
Node NodeO is the EMCY message consumer which is indicated by its attribute
emcyRole. The consumer “consumes” the incoming message, and records the
producer node ID IDN and error reason EED in its attribute emcyRecord.
The above rules consider the EMCY protocol independently from the underly-
ing features of network, such as CAN controller and CAN bus. We will associ-
ate the EMCY service with the underlying features when we do the analysis in
next chapter.
4.2.2 The NMT Service
NMT service defines several network states for the CANOpen device. On one
hand, NMT service stipulate which communication services are supported in
different network states. On the other hand, NMT provides the protocol to
manipulate the states of all devices in the entire system. There are four NMT
states in CANOpen, one of which can be divided into 3 sub-states. Figure 4.6
illustrates all the NMT states and the transitions between them.
• Initialisation: The CANOpen device enters into initialisation directly after
power-up or reset. The NMT state initialisation could be divided into
three NMT sub-states in order to enable a complete or partial reset of a
CANOpen device.
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Figure 4.6: NMT State Transition
1. Initialising: This is the first NMT sub-state the CANOpen device
enters after power-on or hardware reset. After finishing the
basic CANOpen device initialisation the CANOpen device enters
autonomously into the NMT sub-state reset application.
2. Reset application: In this NMT sub-state, the parameters of the
manufacturer-specific profile area and of the standardized device
profile area are set to their power-on values. After setting of the
power-on values, the NMT sub-state reset communication is entered
autonomously.
3. Reset communication: In this NMT sub-state, the parameters of the
communication profile area are set to their power-on values. At the
end of initialisation, the CANOpen device tries to transmit a specific
message to the master to indicate its completion of boot-up. As soon
as it is transmitted successfully, the CANOpen device switches into
pre-operational state.
• Pre-operational: In the pre-operational state, application specific data is not
allowed. Reversely, CANOpen devices can communicate by SDO objects,
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so configuration data are transferred in this state. The CANOpen device
may be switched into the NMT state operational directly under the control
of the master in the network or by means of local control.
• Operational: In the NMT state operational, all communication objects are
active, including the process data object. It is the normal working state
for CANOpen devices.
• Stopped: By switching a CANOpen device into the NMT state stopped,
it is forced to stop the communication altogether. Furthermore, this
NMT state may be used to achieve certain application behavior, which
is manufacture-specified. If there are EMCY messages triggered in this
NMT state they are pending. The most recent active EMCY reason may
be transmitted after the CANOpen device transits into another NMT state.
We use a class in Maude to model the NMT service in a CANOpen device:
class Node | ID : Nat , nmtState : NetworkStatus ,
nmtRole : NmtRole , slaveRecords : CommStateRecordSet ,
where nmtState indicates the NMT states of this node, nmtRole indicates if the
node is the NMT service master or the NMT servcie slaver. The last attribute
slaveRecords is for NMT master only, which records the NMT states of all the
NMT slaves.
NMT state transitions are often triggered by three reasons. The first is the
hardware reset. It will cause the CANOpen device to go into NMT initialisation
state. The second trigger is local control service initiated by application internal
events. The last one is the reception of the NMT node control service issued by
the NMT master.
Through the node control service, the NMT master controls the NMT state of
the NMT slaves. A NMT message could be sent to one certain node or to all
nodes in the CANOpen system. The NMT master controls its own NMT state
machine via local services, which is not specified in the CANOpen standard
CiA301. So our model does not take the NMT master’s NMT state transition
into consideration.
The NMT node control service includes the following message objects:
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• Start Remote Node: The NMT master uses start remote node to change the
NMT state of the selected NMT slaves into NMT state operational.
• Stop Remote Node: The NMT master uses stop remote node to stop all
network communication of the NMT slaves except for the NMT service
itself. The new state of the NMT slaves will be stop.
• Enter Pre-operational: The NMT master uses enter pre-operational to
change the NMT state of the selected NMT slaves into pre-operational.
• Reset Node: This NMT message object can control the selected NMT
slaves to reset the parameters of the manufacture-specific profile area and
of the standardized device profile area. The NMT state of the slaves goes
into reset application.
• Reset Communication: This NMT message object will reset the paramet-
ers of the communication profile area of all selected slaves. The NMT state
of the slaves will become reset communication.
In addition to the node control service, the NMT slave will use boot-up service
to inform the NMT master its completion of boot-up. The boot-up service only
contains one message object.
We simply define the six message objects of node control service as six constants
with sort NetworkStatus. The message object of boot-up service is defined by the
operation:
sort NmtMsg .
op nodeBootUp : Oid -> NmtMsg [format (s d)] .
which takes the object ID of the sender as the only parameter. The sort NmtMsg
is a subclass of FrameData, which means it is can be used as the payload of the
class Frame.
Because the NMT master can control the state of the NMT slave only when the
NMT slave reports its boot-up, the boot-up service is important in NMT service.
Therefore we will show the rewriting rules of sending and receiving boot-up
service first.
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rl [sendBootUp] :
< NodeO : Node | ID : NID , nmtState : resetComm ,
nmtRole : slave >
=>
< NodeO : Node | nmtState : preOp >
< NodeO : Frame | id : calCOBID (1792, NID), other :
nodeBootUp(NodeO) > .
rl [receiveBootUp] :
< NodeO : Node | ID : NID , slaveRecords : CSTRecds ,
nmtRole : master >
< FID : Frame | id : COB , other : nodeBootUp(NodeO2) >
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst : (updateRecord (node
NodeO2 in preOp) toList CSTRecds) >
The first rule indicates that a NMT slave which is in the reset communication
NMT state can automatically enters into the pre-operation state. At the same
time, a boot-up service message is sent to report this transition. The second rule
models the operations of the NMT master receiving the boot-up service message.
The master only simply records the NMT state of the slave. There are two
auxiliary functions in the above rules. One is (op calCOBID : Nat Nat -> Nat
.) which is used to generate the proper COB-ID. Another is
op updateRecord_toList_ : CommStateRecord
CommStateRecordSet -> CommStateRecordSet .
eq updateRecord NdRecd toList nilRdLt = NdRecd .
eq updateRecord (node OID in NtSt) toList ((node OID2
in NtSt2) NdStRecdLst)
=
if OID == OID2
then
(node OID2 in NtSt) NdStRecdLst
else
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(node OID2 in NtSt2) (updateRecord (node OID in
NtSt) toList NdStRecdLst)
fi .
which will insert a new record of node ID and the related NMT state into a set
if the node ID does not exists. If the node is already in the set, it will just update
the node’s NMT state.
The sending and receiving of NMT node control service is very similar, so we take
the reset application message as an example to illustrate how we model the node
control service.
crl [sendResetAppMsgToSingleNode] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : master , ID : NID ,
slaveRecdLst : (CSTRecds2 (node NodeO2 in
NetworkState) CSTRecds) >
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst : (CSTRecds2 (node
NodeO2 in resetApp) CSTRecds) >
< NodeO : Frame | id : (calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID
0), other : (changeNode NodeO2 toState resetApp) >
if NetworkState == stopped or NetworkState == operation
or NetworkState == preOp .
crl [receiveResetAppMsg] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave , nmtState :
NetworkState >
< FID : Frame | id : NID , other : (changeNode NodeO
toState resetApp) >
=>
< NodeO : Node | nmtState : resetApp >
if NetworkState == stopped or NetworkState == operation
or NetworkState == preOp .
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The rule sendResetAppMsgToSingleNode models a NMT master sending the
reset application message. According to the CANOpen standard, this NMT state
transition is allowed when the NMT slave is in any of the three NMT states
stopped, pre-operation and operation. This is specified by the condition of the rule.
Since node control service is unconfirmed, once the NMT master send out this
reset application message, it will change the state of the NMT slave in its record.
The rule receiveResetAppMsg defines the behaviors of a NMT slave when
it receives the reset application message. The CANOpen standard does not
describe how to deal the reset application message if a NMT slave is not in any of
these three states stopped, pre-operation and operation. So we define this rule with
a condition. In addition, as the standard required, the NMT slave will change
its state into reset application if the NMT state is proper.
There are 34 rules for NMT protocols on our model. Furthermore, we also
define some functions used in the rules. In next chapter, we will do the analysis
based on the formal model. To the analyzing goal, we may make a little
modifications of our initial model, and we will points these modifications out.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of CANOpen
In this chapter, we will formally analyze the Full Maude specification of the
control services in the CANOpen standard. For analysis, the first step is to
specify the possbile issues. The goal of the analysis is to validate if the EMCY
protocol is reliable enough to report the application internal error by the EMCY
protocol and if the NMT protocol can be used to fully control the state of
all NMT slaves. We want to investigate if there are inconsistencies between
the EMCY consumer and the EMCY producer or the NMT slave and the
NMT master, and can the inconsistencies be discovered and recovered by the
CANOpen protocol. The protocol is highly nondeterministic, and consequently
there is an explosion of the state database in Maude. Because of the restrict of
the computing power and memory storage, it is not impossible to analysis some
of the cases within a reasonable time.
With the goal of our validation, we structure the rest parts of this chapter
as follows: Section 5.1 explains why the CANOpen formal model needs
underlying network support for the analysis; section 5.2 illustrates how to use
Maude to analyze the CANOpen protocol with the support of the CAN bus
and CAN controllers; since we are interested in helping implementers and
manufactures of CANOpen devices, section 5.3 shows the test cases obtained
from our analysis which could be used in the testing phase of actual equipment
developments.
59
5.1 Underlying Network Support in the Formal Model
Our analysis object is the CANOpen protocol. We have introduced that this
protocol is a high-level application layer and communication profile, and it is
independent of the under-layer network. So our analysis is first started on the
protocol itself without consideration of the under-layer network model. Here
we will use the analysis on the EMCY protocol as an example to show the
simulation of CANOpen protocol.
EMCY protocol is used to report application internal errors, so before we can
analyze the EMCY protocol, we have to define some of the application internal
errors first. In our model, we define four constants genericErr, unknownErr,
tooHigh and tooLow to represent the internal errors. With these constants, we
define an initial state init0 as follows:
op init0 : -> Configuration .
eq init0 = < "Producer" : Node | ID : 1, emcyRole :
EmcyP , errNo : 0, errs : nil , nodeState : errorFree ,
emcyRecord : nilEmcyRecord >
< "Consumer" : Node | ID : 2, emcyRole : EmcyC , errNo :
0, errs : nil , nodeState : errorFree , emcyRecord :
nilEmcyRecord >
< "ValidErrorTypes" : ErrType | validErrName :
(genericErr unknownErr tooHigh tooLow) > .
where the EMCY producer currently has no internal error occurred and the
EMCY error record emcyRecord is empty.
If we use a rewrite command to check one possible state from initial state init0,
there will not be any result given out by Maude after a very long time. This
is consistent with the EMCY protocol. Because the CANOpen standard does
not put a limit on the number of times the EMCY message can be sent, so the
system is non-terminated. Thus, we add a new attribute count into the EMCY
node class, which is the upper bound of the number of times an EMCY node
could send an EMCY message. With this attribute, we set the upper bound of
the times for the Producer to send EMCY messages as 6, then we have a new
initial state init1. We run the same rewrite command on the new initial state,
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then we get the following result:
Configuration :
< "Consumer" : Node | ID : 2,count : 0, emcyRecord :
nilEmcyRecord , emcyRole : EmcyC , errNo : 0, errs :
nil , nodeState : errorFree >
< "Producer" : Node | ID : 1,count : 0, emcyRecord :
nilEmcyRecord , emcyRole : EmcyP , errNo : 0,errs :
nil , nodeState : errorFree >
< "ValidErrorTypes" : ErrType | validErrName
:( genericErr tooHigh tooLow unknownErr)>
This is a possible state from the initial state init1 where all occurred internal
errors are resolved . The value 0 of the attribute count of Consumer indicates
that 6 EMCY messages are sent out. Our formal model of the EMCY protocol
acts well in accordance with CANOpen standard. So we will start to check if
the protocol would lead the system into some unexpected status which conflicts
with the protocol.
For the EMCY protocol, the CANOpen standard only depicts that the EMCY
producer could report and clear application internal errors and the EMCY
consumer need record the EMCY events. To check if there is any problem for the
EMCY protocol, we could check the consistency between EMCY error status of
the EMCY producer and the record in the EMCY consumer. With the following
two search commands from initial state init1, we compared if there is a final
state that the errs is not empty but emcyRecord is empty or errs is empty but
emcyRecord is not empty.
(search init1 =>! < "Producer" : Node | errs :
ESET:EmcyErrNameSet >
< "Consumer" : Node | emcyRecord : ER:EmcyRecords >
C:Configuration such that ESET:EmcyErrNameSet =/= nil
and ER:EmcyRecords == nilEmcyRecord . )
(search init1 =>! < "Producer" : Node | errs :
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ESET:EmcyErrNameSet >
< "Consumer" : Node | emcyRecord : ER:EmcyRecords >
C:Configuration such that ESET:EmcyErrNameSet == nil
and ER:EmcyRecords =/= nilEmcyRecord . )
Both of these two commands give the result “No solution”. Thus, with our
analysis result, taking no consideration of the underlying network, the EMCY
protocol works well. Obviously, this is far from what we expect. We hope
we could find some issues about this protocol by the Maude model. They
are probably some small issues because CANOpen protocol has been put into
practice for decades. So this is one of the reasons why we think about taking
underlying network into our model.
Another reason is because the CANOpen protocol implicitly assumes the
underlying network protocol is reliable, so it does not provide the verification
mechanism. The reliability contains two aspects: one is that the message sent
out by CANOpen device will always be delivered; the other is that the messages
deliver order is the same as the messages sending order. But in the real case,
it does not sound reasonable that a message is successfully delivered when the
hard link is cut off. This point is also mentioned in [20] where they believe
message lost could happen in the CAN controllers.
In the embedded automation system, the CANOpen protocol is widely used
with CAN bus. More precisely, CAN bus was introduced first, then CANOpen
merged later which was designed as a CAN Application Layer(CAL) protocol. So
we have strong reasons to use the features of the CAN bus and CAN controllers
as the lower level network prototype.
5.2 Analysis of CANOpen with Low-level Network Fea-
ture
This section will show some of our analysis results of the CANOpen based on
our formal model in chapter 4. The goal of the analysis to find if there is any
weakness in CANOpen, so the analysis in this section mainly focuses on the
erroneous behaviors of EMCY protocol and NMT protocol.
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5.2.1 Complements to The Formal Model for Analysis
The state transitions in CANOpen is complicated and there are so many
possibilities that one state to another that bring difficult to our analysis.
Thus, we add additional attributes failedRxbuf and textttfailedTxbuf to class
Controller in our model. These two attributes are supposed to capture
the discarded incoming messages and outgoing messages respectively for a
CANOpen device. In addition, CANOpen controllers will discard messages
when the buffer is full in our model, but we cannot make sure if the message is
discarded or just not sent if we do not have these two auxiliary attributes. They
are very helpful to locate issues of CANOpen protocol in our model.
To integrate the Controller and the Bus with the CANOpen Node, we
also need some other functions and attributes. Since each CANOpen
device has one and only one CAN controller associated with it, we add
another attribute controllerID to class Node whose value is the ID of
an instance of Controller. Furthermore, we also define a function (op
pushMsg_toController_ : Object Object -> Object .) which pushes a
CAN bus Frame to a Controller.
5.2.2 Simulation of the EMCY Protocol
The goal EMCY protocol is to report application internal errors to other nodes in
the CANOpen system. The device behaviors for the producer after its sending
the EMCY message and the device behaviors of the receiver after its receiving
the message are not part of the CANOpen standard. So what we need to
analysis is that if the EMCY messages can always be delivered successfully.
Before simulation, we define a initial state init2 first as follows:
op init2 : -> Configuration .
eq init2 =
< "Sensor" : Node | ID : 1, emcyRole : EmcyP ,
errNo : 0, errs : nil , count : 4,
nodeState : errorFree , emcyRecord : nilEmcyRecord ,
controllerID : "S_Controller" >
< "Center" : Node | ID : 2, emcyRole : EmcyC ,
errNo : 0, errs : nil , count : 0,
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nodeState : errorFree , emcyRecord : nilEmcyRecord ,
controllerID : "C_Controller" >
< "ValidErrorTypes" : ErrType |
validErrName : (tooHigh tooLow) >
GLOBAL (
< "C_Controller" : Controller |
txbuf : nilQue , rxbuf : nilQue , filter : 81,
txbufCap : 4, rxbufCap : 4,
failedTxbuf : nilQue , failedRxbuf : nilQue >
< "S_Controller" : Controller |
txbuf : nilQue , rxbuf : nilQue , filter : 82,
txbufCap : 4, rxbufCap : 4,
failedTxbuf : nilQue , failedRxbuf : nilQue >
< "Bus" : Bus | status : free , owner : nilOid >) .
where we set the size of all buffers withing all nodes including both sending
and receiving buffers as 4. Similar to analysis in section 5.1, we also need our
self-defined internal error names which is listed in ValidErrorTypes. But to
reduce the analysis state space, we only define two error names in the initial
state init. We assign the message type of the EMCY message an number 80,
so according to this value and the device ID, we also configure the values of
attribute filter as 81 and 82 for C_Controller and S_Controller respectively.
To find if an EMCY message can get lost, we can use a similar search command
in section 5.1
(search [1] init2 =>!
< "Sensor" : Node | errs : ESET:EmcyErrNameSet >
< "Center" : Node | emcyRecord : ER:EmcyRecords >
C:Configuration such that ESET:EmcyErrNameSet =/= nil
and ER:EmcyRecords == nilEmcyRecord . )
(search [1] init2 =>!
< "Sensor" : Node | errs : ESET:EmcyErrNameSet >
< "Center" : Node | emcyRecord : ER:EmcyRecords >
C:Configuration such that ESET:EmcyErrNameSet == nil
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and ER:EmcyRecords =/= nilEmcyRecord . )
to check if there is at least one final state where the Sensor occurred error record
is not consistent with the EMCY record in Center. After a couple of seconds,
Maude returns “No solution”. This is reasonable result because we set the size
of buffer as 4 and the value of count is also 4. It means there will not be message
lost under this condition.
To expose the potential problem, we change the size of buffers to 1 and keep
the count value as 4. We do the same search simulation. This time Maude gives
out a solution:
C:Configuration -->
GLOBAL (
< "Bus" : Bus | owner : nilOid ,status : free >
< "C_Controller" : Controller |
failedRxbuf : nilQue , failedTxbuf : nilQue ,
filter : 81, rxbufCap : 1,
rxbuf : nilQue , txbufCap : 1, txbuf : nilQue >
< "S_Controller" : Controller |
failedRxbuf : nilQue ,
failedTxbuf :(< "Sensor" : Frame | id : 81,
other : Emergency eecerr withDesc
tooHigh from 1 > :
< "Sensor" : Frame | id : 81,
other : Emergency eecerr withDesc
tooHigh from 1 >),
filter : 82, rxbufCap : 1, rxbuf : nilQue ,
txbufCap : 1, txbuf : nilQue >)
< "ValidErrorTypes" : ErrType |
validErrName :( tooHigh tooLow)> ;
ER:EmcyRecords --> nilEmcyRecord ;
ESET:EmcyErrNameSet --> tooHigh tooHigh ;
V#0: Node --> Node ;
V#1: AttributeSet --> ID : 1,
controllerID : "S_Controller", count : 0,
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emcyRecord : nilEmcyRecord ,
emcyRole : EmcyP , errNo : 2,
nodeState : errorOccured ;
V#2: Node --> Node ;
V#3: AttributeSet --> ID : 2,
controllerID : "C_Controller", count : 0,
emcyRole : EmcyC , errNo : 0,
errs : nil ,nodeState : errorFree
where there are two internal errors tooHigh in Sensor but no record about these
two errors in Controller. This means EMCY messages reporting these two
errors are lost. This is confirmed by the value of failedTxbuf in S_Controller.
It is possible that the EMCY messages are discarded by the controller of Sensor
since the txbuf could be full. So with the model of CAN bus and CAN
controller, the EMCY protocol cannot ensure the EMCY message is delivered.
This could lead some critical problems in real case. For example, a warehouse
requires the temperature stays between -20 to -15 degree. A sensor inside
detects the temperature of the warehouse. If the temperature exceeds the
temperature range, the sensor could report this to the central control unit. The
central control unit will start or stop the cooler accordingly. It is possible that
the cooler encounters some internal error and report this to the central control
unit. If this message get lost, the control unit will never know the cooler cannot
work. So the temperature of the warehouse may be over the upper bound. This
would be a serious problem.
5.2.3 Simulation of the NMT Protocol
The purpose of the NMT protocol is to manage the network state of the
CANOpen device. The CANOpen standard depicts how to use the NMT
protocol to control CANOpen device states, but the reasons triggering the
control service are not specified. On the other side, there is one master in the
CANOpen system recording all other slaves’ network states, so our analysis
can only focus on the consistency of network states between NMT slave and
the record of NMT master.
First, we will use a very simple search simulation to show the basic behaviors
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of the NMT protocol. For a new CANOpen device to join into a CANOpen
system, if it can enter into a normal working state. We define the initial state
init3 as follows:
op init3 : -> Configuration .
eq init3 =
GLOBAL (
< "BUS" : Bus | status : free , owner : nilOid >
< "CONTROLLER_ONE" : Controller | txbuf : nilQue ,
rxbuf : nilQue , filter : (20000 21792) ,
txbufCap : 100, rxbufCap : 100,
failedRxbuf : nilQue , failedTxbuf : nilQue >
< "CONTROLLER_TWO" : Controller | txbuf : nilQue ,
rxbuf : nilQue , filter : (10000) ,
txbufCap : 100, rxbufCap : 100,
failedRxbuf : nilQue , failedTxbuf : nilQue >)
< "Node_ONE" : Node | ID : 1, errNo : 0,
nodeState : errorFree , nmtRole : master ,
controllerID : "CONTROLLER_ONE",
slaveRecdLst : nilRdLt ,
networkState : operation >
< "Node_TWO" : Node | ID : 2, errNo : 0,
nodeState : errorFree , nmtRole : slave ,
controllerID : "CONTROLLER_TWO",
slaveRecdLst : nilRdLt ,
networkState : initialising > .
where node Node_ONE acts as the NMT master and node Node_TWO acts as the
NMT slave. Similar to EMCY analysis, we configure controller CONTROLLER_ONE
associated with node Node_ONE and controller CONTROLLER_TWO associated with
node Node_TWO. There two types of message in this simulation. We assign the
message type number 1792 to the boot-up message and 0 to the NMT message,
which is because NMT message has higher priority. We also need to configure
the attribute filter to accept these two set of messages. The NMT slave is
in NMT state initialising which means it is in the boot-up process. On the
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other, the attribute slaveRecdLst in the NMT master is empty, so the NMT
slave is new to join the CANOpen system. To validate if the NMT slave can
work properly, we need to find if the NMT slave can enter into operation state.
We execute the search command as below and get the result from Maude:
(search [1] init3 =>* C:Configuration
< "Node_TWO" : Node | networkState : operation > .)
Solution 1
C:Configuration -->
GLOBAL (
< "BUS" : Bus | owner : nilOid , status :
transmitted >
< "CONTROLLER_ONE" : Controller |
failedRxbuf : nilQue , failedTxbuf : nilQue ,
filter :(20000 21792) , rxbufCap : 100,
rxbuf : nilQue , txbufCap : 100 ,txbuf : nilQue >
< "CONTROLLER_TWO" : Controller |
failedRxbuf : nilQue , failedTxbuf : nilQue ,
filter :(1001 10000) , rxbufCap : 100,
rxbuf : nilQue , txbufCap : 100, txbuf : nilQue >)
< "Node_ONE" : Node | ID : 1,
controllerID : "CONTROLLER_ONE", errNo : 0,
networkState : operation , nmtRole : master ,
nodeState : errorFree ,
slaveRecdLst : node "Node_TWO" in operation > ;
V#0: Node --> Node ;
V#1: AttributeSet --> ID : 2,
controllerID : "CONTROLLER_TWO", errNo : 0,
nmtRole : slave , nodeState : errorFree ,
slaveRecdLst : nilRdLt
One solution is obtained from Maude where node Node_TWO is in operation
state and the attribute slaveRecdLst in node Node_ONE also records this state
correctly. So for a new CANOpen device to join into a CANOpen system, the
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new device could work properly.
However, we are also interested in if a new CANOpen device can always
join into a CANOpen system. To analyze this problem, we reduce the size of
buffers to 1. This could help us to find the a counter example more quickly.
Because decreasing the size of buffers could reduce the rewriting steps to the
state where the buffer is full. In addition, we need a new initial state which
introduce another CANOpen node in our system. We name this new initial
state as init4. Compared to init3, the added node has the value of attribute
ID 3 and the object ID Node_THREE. Moreover, there must be a corresponding
instance of Controller in init3, and the filter in each Controller should be
correct configured. With this initial state, we try to find a state that the new
CANOpen device has finishing boot-up and sent out the boot-up message to
inform the NMT master, but the message cannot be delivered. According to the
CANOpen protocol, the message will only be sent once and no acknowledge is
required, so we believe that the NMT master will never know the exist of the
new NMT slave. We have the following search command, and we also get the
result from Maude:
(search [1] init4 =>* C:Configuration
< "Node_TWO" : Node | networkState : preOp >
GLOBAL (C2:Configuration
< "CONTROLLER_ONE" : Controller |
failedRxbuf : T:Que > )
such that T:Que ==
< "CONTROLLER_TWO" : Frame | id : 21792,
other : node "Node_TWO" bootUp > .)
Solution 1
C2:Configuration -->
< "BUS" : Bus | owner : nilOid ,
status : transmitted >
< "CONTROLLER_THREE" : Controller |
failedRxbuf : nilQue , failedTxbuf : nilQue ,
filter : 10000, rxbufCap : 1, rxbuf : nilQue ,
txbufCap : 1, txbuf : nilQue >
< "CONTROLLER_TWO" : Controller |
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failedRxbuf : nilQue , failedTxbuf : nilQue ,
filter : 10000, rxbufCap : 1, rxbuf : nilQue ,
txbufCap : 1, txbuf : nilQue > ;
C:Configuration -->
< "Node_ONE" : Node | ID : 1,
controllerID : "CONTROLLER_ONE",
errNo : 0, networkState : operation ,
nmtRole : master , nodeState : errorFree ,
slaveRecdLst : nilRdLt >
< "Node_THREE" : Node | ID : 3,
controllerID : "CONTROLLER_THREE",
errNo : 0, networkState : preOp ,
nmtRole : slave , nodeState : errorFree ,
slaveRecdLst : nilRdLt > ;
T:Que -->
< "CONTROLLER_TWO" : Frame |
id : 21792, other : node "Node_TWO" bootUp > ;
V#0: Node --> Node ;
V#1: AttributeSet -->
ID : 2, controllerID : "CONTROLLER_TWO", errNo : 0,
nmtRole : slave , nodeState : errorFree ,
slaveRecdLst : nilRdLt ;
V#2: Controller -->
Controller ;
V#3: AttributeSet -->
failedTxbuf : nilQue ,
filter :(20000 21792 30000 31792) ,
rxbufCap : 1, rxbuf :
< "CONTROLLER_THREE" : Frame | id : 31792,
other : node "Node_THREE" bootUp >,
txbufCap :1, txbuf : nilQue
Since the boot-up message probably is delayed in transmission (CAN bus
busy), it is much easier to describe the search by the attribute failedRxbuf
in CONTROLLER_ONE which is the NMT master. If node Node_TWO is in NMT
state preOp and its boot-up message can be found in the failedRxbuf of
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CONTROLLER_ONE, then we can confirm that node Node_TWO joins into this system
failed. This condition do not only happen when a new device needs to join
the CANOpen system, but also could happen when a NMT Master send reset
communication and reset node message to NMT slave.
In the CANOpen standard CiA301, it only specifies the expected NMT states
transition from one state to another. However, it does not indicate the default
behaviors when a device receives a NMT service that does not match any
satisfied states transition condition. For example, a NMT slave is currently
in operation state when it receives an NMT message enter pre-operation from
a NMT master. So another interesting property is that, if this uncovered
circumstance could happen. To validate this property, we define another initial
state init5:
op init5 : -> Configuration .
eq init5 =
GLOBAL (
< "BUS" : Bus | status : free , owner : nilOid >
< "CONTROLLER_ONE" : Controller | txbuf : nilQue ,
rxbuf : nilQue , filter : (20000 21792) ,
txbufCap : 100, rxbufCap : 1,
failedRxbuf : nilQue , failedTxbuf : nilQue >
< "CONTROLLER_TWO" : Controller | txbuf : nilQue ,
rxbuf : nilQue , filter : (10000) , txbufCap : 1,
rxbufCap : 1, failedRxbuf : nilQue ,
failedTxbuf : nilQue >)
< "Node_ONE" : Node | ID : 1, errNo : 0,
nodeState : errorFree ,
controllerID : "CONTROLLER_ONE",
nmtRole : master ,
slaveRecdLst : node "Node_TWO" in operation ,
networkState : operation >
< "Node_TWO" : Node | ID : 2, errNo : 0,
nodeState : errorFree ,
controllerID : "CONTROLLER_TWO",
nmtRole : slave , slaveRecdLst : nilRdLt ,
networkState : operation > .
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where node Node_ONE is the NMT master and node Node_TWO is the NMT slave.
The NMT slave is in NMT state operation which is correctly recorded in the
NMT master. We use the following search command to find a state that the
NMT slave is in NMT state operation but its related rxbuf contains a NMT
service Start Remote Node. After a few minutes, we get a solution from Maude.
Thus, it is possible that a CANOpen system reaches to an unspecified network
state. This is another potential problem of the NMT protocol.
(search [1] init3 =>* C:Configuration
< "Node_TWO" : Node | networkState : operation >
GLOBAL (
C2:Configuration
< "CONTROLLER_TWO" : Controller |
rxbuf : < "CONTROLLER_ONE" : Frame |
id : 10000,
other : (changeNode "Node_TWO" toState
operation) > >) .)
Solution 1
C2:Configuration -->
< "BUS" : Bus | owner : nilOid ,
status : transmitted >
< "CONTROLLER_ONE" : Controller |
failedRxbuf : nilQue , failedTxbuf : nilQue ,
filter :(20000 21792) , rxbufCap : 1,
rxbuf : nilQue , txbufCap : 100,
txbuf : nilQue > ;
C:Configuration -->
< "Node_ONE" : Node | ID : 1,
controllerID : "CONTROLLER_ONE", errNo : 0,
networkState : operation , nmtRole : master ,
nodeState : errorFree ,
slaveRecdLst : node "Node_TWO" in operation > ;
V#0: Node --> Node ;
V#1: AttributeSet --> ID : 2,
controllerID : "CONTROLLER_TWO", errNo : 0,
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nmtRole : slave , nodeState : errorFree ,
slaveRecdLst : nilRdLt ;
V#2: Controller --> Controller ;
V#3: AttributeSet -->
failedRxbuf : < "CONTROLLER_ONE" : Frame |
id : 10000,
other : changeNode "Node_TWO" toState preOp >,
failedTxbuf : nilQue , filter : 10000, rxbufCap : 1,
txbufCap : 1, txbuf : nilQue ;
V#4: Frame --> Frame ;
V#5: AttributeSet --> (none).AttributeSet
We also find some other problems when building the model. These problems
are caused by the underspecification of CANOpen protocol. For example, in
CiA301, it mentions a CANOpen device can switch into NMT state operational
also by means of local control but without any more explanation. This conflicts
with the NMT service start remote node. Because of its logical basis and its initial
model semantics, a Maude module defines a precise mathematical model[21].
When building the model by Maude, we can find the underspecification from
the documentations and specifications.
With consideration of low-level network features, we find some potential issues
in the control service of CANOpen protocol. Our model and analysis are based
on CANOpen standard. Because of the complexity of the CANOpen protocol
and the limitation of time, we also need some confirmation from DNV GL on
whether our analysis is valuable. They showed our analysis results to FMC
Technology which is an American global provider that provides equipment
and services for subsea system. FMC Technologies’ subsea systems business
encompasses a wide range of equipment and technologies that are required
to explore, drill and develop offshore oil and gas fields. They have a strong
global presence in all of the world’s major basins. With reference of their
industry experience, they give us some positive feedbacks that they find the
analysis realistic and acknowledge that these problems potentially exists in the
CANOpen protocol. They cannot completely rely on the CANOpen standard
only, and some other manufacture-specific process are required to handle these
problems. Hence, their comments are also supportive to our analysis results.
73
5.3 Examples of Test Case
The motivation of our modeling and analysis is from the industry. We hope our
work could also be helpful for implementers and manufacturers of CANOpen
devices. Most of them probably have no background of Maude or even formal
analysis. The test case is a direct way for the engineers and developers to
understand and practice. Actually, in the development of subsea equipment,
testing-driven model is widely used, which is supposed to help developers to
derive test cases from it. After running them, test results can be evaluated
automatically. The formal model helps to check the design and requirements
before implementation as well[22].
From our abstract model and the analysis applied to the model, we can obtain
specific abstract test cases. We list some test case examples by Table 5.1, Table
5.2 and Table 5.3, which are related to the issues we discovered in CiA301. If the
equipments using EMCY service for internal error reporting, test case described
by Table 5.1 can test if errors can be reliably delivered. Table 5.2 refers to the
condition discovered by our analysis that a new NMT slave probably could not
join a CANOpen system. The test case in Table 5.3 is to test if the system can
handle unexpected NMT states not explicitly depicted in CiA301.
Table 5.1: Test Case Example of Reporting Error By EMCY Service
Test Name utilization of EMCY service to report internal error
Test Description
In the system, there is at least one CANOpen device
as the EMCY producer and one CANOpen device
as the EMCY consumer. The EMCY producer will
use EMCY service to report internal errors, and the
EMCY consumer can record the error.
Precondition
1. Both the EMCY producer and the EMCY con-
sumers are in the same CANOpen system
2. At first, the EMCY producer is in error free state and
no error record of the EMCY producer in the EMCY
consumer
3. An internal error incurred, the EMCY producer
sends out EMCY message
Expected Result
1. The EMCY producer is in the error occurred state
2. The EMCY consumer records the error
These abstract test cases can be concretized to practical test cases for system
under tests(SUT). One way is for example by attribute translating from the
abstract test case to concrete level. The concrete stimulation can then be
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Table 5.2: Test Case Example of adding new CANOpen device
Test Name add new device into CANOpen system
Test Description
A CANOpen device can join a CANOpen system
which means the new device can communicate with
other devices in the network. The new device is a
NMT slave, and it will in the management of the
NMT master in the CANOpen system.
Precondition
1. The NMT master of an existing CANOpen system
is in operation state.
2. A new CANOpen device is plugged into the
existing CANOpen system, and no record of the new
device in the NMT master.
3. The new CANOpen is powered up.
Expected Result
1. The NMT slave is in operation state.
2. The NMT master records that the NMT slave is in
operation.
Table 5.3: Test Case Example of Controlling NMT Slaves
Test Name control CANOpen device network state
Test Description
In CANOpen system, a NMT master can record and
control the state of NMT slaves. There is at least a
NMT slave in the CANOpen system.
Precondition
1. The NMT master of an existing CANOpen system
is in operation state.
2. The NMT slave is in operation state.
3. The NMT master records the state of the NMT
slave as operation.
4. The NMT master sends Enter Pre-operational
message to the NMT slave
Expected Result
1. The NMT slave enter into pre-operation state.
2. The NMT master records that the NMT slave is in
pre-operation.
performed in the SUT by the test platform. The output of the SUT can also
be generalized to the abstract level of the test model, and be compare to the
expected outputs encoded in the abstract test cases. So test evaluation is
based on a abstract/concreteness relation between the traces of the abstract test
module and the concrete system under test.
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Part III
Conclusion
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Chapter 6
Concluding and Future Works
6.1 Contributions and Study Results
Actually, CANOpen is a complex protocol that consists of many services. The
protocol description covers many aspects, from very low level details (frames,
bytes, bits etc) to very high level explanations. The services (NMT, EMCY, etc)
are also interconnected, making it quite complicated. Moreover, there are also
options and parameters which gives the protocol a large configuration space.
The protocol is also highly dependent on the applications. Without a complete
picture of the CANOpen protocol and underlying network prototype, it is easy
to end up, for example with a model that over-approximate the behaviors and
hence far from the actual protocol behaviors, and we may get the fals-positive
analysis results.
This thesis models parts of the CANOpen protocol and related underlying
network features, then investigates the soundness of the CANOpen protocol.
In particular, it has investigated the EMCY protocol and the NMT protocol
by building and analyzing the respective Maude formal model. CANOpen
is designed for industry utilization and Maude is a formal tool based on
mathematical theory, so this thesis and our work are also a combination of
formal method with industry application.
In chapter 1, we proposed several problems to be addressed in this thesis. We
will give a concluding answers to these problems according to the work showed
in the thesis.
1. How can we use Maude and rewriting logic to model a complex
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communication protocol such as CANOpen?
To model a communication protocol, we need to have a deep understanding
of the protocol first. The next step is to find the “interesting” parts of the
protocol where potential issues could occur. Because of the complexity and
the time constraints, we cannot model every part of the protocol. With the
understanding of the protocol, we can have ideas of the possible vulnerabilities.
Moreover, we also determine our research range with reference to practical
experiences from DNV GL. In the other hand, choosing the appropriate
modeling level is important as well. A model with every detail of a real system
typically cannot execute efficiently, so it is not useful for analysis and validation.
Actually, a model is always an abstract of a real system omitting some details
but not too much. A communication system is a collection of components
(nodes, messages, etc), can then be represented as a multi-set of objects. Maude
and its extension Full Maude support object-oriented specifications by defining
class, object, message and the operation of message passing. The dynamic
behaviors of CANOpen can be directly modeled by rules in a more object-
oriented style.
2. What are the benefits of formal analysis when applied to the CANOpen
protocol?
Before analysis, we need build the formal model first. CANOpen protocol is
depicted by human languages with ambiguity and underspecification. But
formal model is precise, it can help us to find ambiguous and underspecification
problems. A typical testing on CANOpen devices is black box, ones cannot
locate errors easily when finding the problems. The formal analysis can expose
the details of states in a system, even the internal states. This is helpful to
find the reasons of found problems. The execution of our formal analysis tool
Maude is efficient, and it also provides different analysis methods (frew, search
etc) which provides flexibility to validate different properties of CANOpen.
Though our model and analysis on the model, we find that EMCY service is not
always reliable, a NMT slave cannot be ensured to join into a CANOpen system
successfully and some other problems. Hence, formal model tools and analysis
such as Maude are useful to validate communication protocol like CANOpen.
3. Considering validations, can issues discovered by the analysis be
understood by the application engineer? Are the issues found relevant and
realistic for equipments suppliers using CANOpen?
We find some issues when doing analysis on CANOpen. But we also need
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to check if the issues are valuable in the industry production, so we provide
our analysis results to both DNV GL researchers and FMC engineers. DNV
GL processes verification and certifications of subsea systems or equipment
around the world, and FMC as the manufacture provides industry-leading
subsea equipments and services. Their positive feedbacks confirm that
issues discovered by our analysis could actually exist in realistic case. It
needs specific complements to the CANOpen protocol when implementing
CANOpen equipments.
4.How to identify the discovered issues on real system?
Finding the potential issues by formal analysis is the first step. DNV GL and
we hope these discovered issues can be helpful in their system testing and
verification. This is also our initial motivation of this master project. We
can translate our formal analysis into testing cases: the initial state of formal
analysis is seen as precondition in testing; the analysis result is described as
expected or unexpected testing result. In the other side, the potential issues can
also be taken into consideration by developer who develop and implement the
subsea facilities. The equipments could be more robust if the developers could
handle the problems in the design and development procedure.
Because of the time constraint, our model and analysis also have shortcomings.
Maude is very efficient, and it can be comparable with the state-of-the-art
tool SPIN[23]. When we are doing rewriting from a complex initial state, we
sometimes cannot obtain a result from Maude. So we have to improve the
efficiency of our formal model. One way is to ignore more details which will
not affect the analysis results. Another way is to refine our model’s expression
pattern. This requires more experiences and skills in Maude model language.
6.2 Future Works
It is always desirable to explore if there is any more issues existing in CANOpen
protocol. We have three suggestions which may be helpful in this direction. The
first is real-time consideration. Since CANOpen is real-time communication,
every message should be delivered within a fixed time interval. If we could
take the time factor into consideration, it may expose more issues. The
second suggestion is to study a real case. CANOpen is highly dependent on
applications, the standard leaves many options and flexibilities for the specific
applications. With a real case, we can model more behaviors which can be seen
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as the complements of CANOpen. Finally, we may apply some other analysis
methods on the formal model. Besides the frew and search, Maude also supports
other analysis methods, such as linear temporal logic model checking which also
focuses on reachability property. Linear temporal logic allows specification of
properties such as safety properties and liveness properties. We can check more
properties of the CANOpen system, so there are more chances to discover other
potential issues.
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Appendix A
Maude Code for CANOpen
Model
fmod PARA-QUE{X :: TRIV} is
protecting NAT .
sorts NeQue Que .
subsort X$Elt < NeQue < Que .
****Define ground term of Queue
op nilQue : -> Que [ctor] .
****Queue constructor
op _:_ : Que Que -> Que [ctor assoc id: nilQue] .
****Non-empty Queue Contructor
op _:_ : NeQue Que -> NeQue [ctor ditto] .
op _:_ : Que NeQue -> NeQue [ctor ditto] .
vars E E2 : X$Elt .
vars Q Q2 : Que .
vars NEQ NEQ2 : NeQue .
****Add element to the end of queue
op _addTo_ : X$Elt Que -> Que .
**** eq E addTo nilQue = Que : E .
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eq E addTo Q = Q : E .
****Eliminate the element from the head of queue
op pop : Que -> Que .
eq pop(nilQue) = nilQue .
eq pop(E) = nilQue .
eq pop(E : NEQ) = NEQ .
****Get the first element of Queue
op top : Que -> X$Elt .
eq top(E : NEQ) = E .
****Length of a Queue
op length : Que -> Nat .
eq length(nilQue) = 0 .
eq length(E : Q) = 1 + length(Q) .
endfm
(omod MESSAGE is
including NAT .
sort CanId .
op 0 : -> CanId . ***** NMT service
op 1792 : -> CanId . ***** NMT error control
op 1408 : -> CanId . ***** SDO tx
op 1536 : -> CanId . ***** SDO rx
sort FrameData .
class Frame | id : Nat,
other : FrameData .
vars FID FID2 : Oid .
vars N N2 : Nat .
op _prior_ : Object Object -> Bool .
eq (< FID : Frame | id : N >) prior (< FID2 : Frame |
id : N2 >) = N < N2 .
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sort MsgContent .
subsort FrameData < MsgContent .
msg _withID_from_ : MsgContent Nat Oid -> Msg .
endom)
(fmod BUS-STATUS is
sort BusStatus .
op free : -> BusStatus .
op started : -> BusStatus .
op arbitrated : -> BusStatus .
op transmitting : -> BusStatus .
op transmitted : -> BusStatus .
endfm)
(omod BUS is
including BUS-STATUS .
class Bus | status : BusStatus,
owner : Oid .
endom)
(omod MSG-RULES is
including MESSAGE .
including BUS .
including CONTROLLER .
including PARA-QUE{QUEUE-ELEMENT} .
sort GlobalConfiguration .
subsort GlobalConfiguration < Object .
op GLOBAL : Configuration -> GlobalConfiguration [ctor] .
sort NilOid .
subsort NilOid < Oid .
op nilOid : -> NilOid [ctor] .
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var BID : Oid .
var BSStatus : BusStatus .
vars CID CID2 : Oid .
vars FRAM FRAM2 : Object .
vars BUF BUF2 : Que .
vars NEBUF NEBUF2 : NeQue .
var CONF : Configuration .
var DATA : FrameData .
var COD : Nat .
var FILTER : NatSet .
var N : Nat .
var FID : Oid .
**** opeartion defination
op arbitrate : Configuration -> Configuration .
**** if the bus status is not "started", then ignore this
**** operation
ceq arbitrate (< BID : Bus | status : BSStatus > CONF) =
< BID : Bus | > CONF if BSStatus =/= started .
**** if there is no message to send, controller will
**** quit the competition
eq arbitrate (< CID : Controller | txbuf : nilQue >
< BID : Bus | status : started > CONF) =
< CID : Controller | >
arbitrate (< BID : Bus | > CONF) .
**** if there are 2 or more controllers in the
**** configuration wanna send message,
**** compare each two of them to find the highest
****message_id priority
eq arbitrate ( < CID : Controller | txbuf :
(FRAM : BUF) >
< CID2 : Controller | txbuf : (FRAM2 : BUF2) >
< BID : Bus | status : started >
CONF )
=
if (FRAM prior FRAM2)
then < CID2 : Controller | > arbitrate (
< CID : Controller | > < BID : Bus | > CONF)
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else
< CID : Controller | > arbitrate (
< CID2 : Controller | > < BID : Bus | > CONF)
fi .
**** if there is only one controller which has message
**** to send, then it is the winner.
eq arbitrate ( < CID : Controller | txbuf : NEBUF >
< BID : Bus | status : started > )
=
< CID : Controller | > < BID : Bus | status : arbitrated,
owner : CID > .
**** operation defination
op deliver_to_ : Msg Configuration -> Configuration .
eq deliver (DATA withID COD from CID) to
< CID2 : Controller | rxbuf : BUF, filter : FILTER,
rxbufCap : N, failedRxbuf : BUF2 > =
if CID == CID2
then
< CID2 : Controller | >
else
if ((FILTER percolate COD) and
(length (BUF)) < N)
then
< CID2 : Controller | rxbuf : (BUF :
< CID : Frame | id : COD, other : DATA >) >
else
if FILTER percolate COD ****rxbuf overflows
then
< CID2 : Controller | failedRxbuf : (BUF2 :
< CID : Frame | id : COD, other : DATA >) >
else
< CID2 : Controller | >
fi
fi
fi .
**** operation defination
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op broadcast_in_ : Msg Configuration -> Configuration .
**** Ignore if the controller is the sender
eq broadcast (DATA withID COD from CID) in
(< CID : Controller | > CONF) =
< CID : Controller | >
(broadcast (DATA withID COD from CID) in CONF) .
**** change the bus status if frame is
**** delivered to all controllers
eq broadcast (DATA withID COD from CID) in
( < BID : Bus | status : transmitting, owner : CID > ) =
< BID : Bus | status : transmitted, owner : nilOid > .
**** deliver the frame to one controller which is
**** different from the sender
ceq broadcast (DATA withID COD from CID) in
( < CID2 : Controller | > < BID : Bus | owner : CID,
status : transmitting > CONF ) =
(deliver (DATA withID COD from CID) to
< CID2 : Controller | >)
broadcast (DATA withID COD from CID) in
( CONF < BID : Bus | >)
if CID =/= CID2 .
rl[startArbitration] :
GLOBAL(< BID : Bus | owner : nilOid,
status : free >
< CID : Controller | txbuf : NEBUF >
CONF)
=>
GLOBAL( arbitrate (
< BID : Bus | status : started >
< CID : Controller | >
CONF) ) .
rl[transmitMsg] :
GLOBAL (
< CID : Controller | txbuf : ( < FID : Frame |
id : COD, other : DATA > : BUF) >
< BID : Bus | owner : CID, status : arbitrated >
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CONF )
=>
GLOBAL (
< CID : Controller | txbuf : BUF >
broadcast (DATA withID COD from CID) in (
< BID : Bus | status : transmitting >
CONF) ) .
rl[backToIdle] :
GLOBAL (
< BID : Bus | owner : nilOid, status : transmitted >
CONF)
=>
GLOBAL (< BID : Bus | status : free >
CONF ) .
endom)
(omod EMERGENCY-OBJ is
sort EmcyErrCode .
op eecerr : -> EmcyErrCode [ctor] .
op eecclear : -> EmcyErrCode [ctor] .
sort EmcyErrBody .
op clearErr : -> EmcyErrBody [ctor] .
op genericErr : -> EmcyErrBody [ctor] .
op unknownErr : -> EmcyErrBody [ctor] .
op tooHigh : -> EmcyErrBody [ctor] .
op tooLow : -> EmcyErrBody [ctor] .
sort EmcyErrNameSet .
subsort EmcyErrBody < EmcyErrNameSet .
op nil : -> EmcyErrNameSet [ctor] .
op __ : EmcyErrNameSet EmcyErrNameSet ->
EmcyErrNameSet [ctor comm assoc id: nil] .
msg Emergency_withDesc_ : EmcyErrCode EmcyErrBody -> Msg .
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class ErrType | validErrName : EmcyErrNameSet .
endom)
(omod NODE is
including NAT .
including EMERGENCY-OBJ .
sort NodeStatus .
op errorFree : -> NodeStatus .
op errorOccured : -> NodeStatus .
class Node | ID : Nat,
errNo : Nat,
nodeState : NodeStatus .
vars NodeO NodeO2 : Oid .
vars O O2 : Oid .
vars IDN IDN2 : Nat .
vars N N2 : Nat .
var NdStatus : NodeStatus .
vars S S2 : EmcyErrNameSet .
var EED : EmcyErrBody .
rl[nodeErrorOccure] :
< O : ErrType | validErrName : EED S >
< NodeO : Node | errNo : N,
nodeState : NdStatus >
=>
< NodeO : Node | errNo : s(N),
nodeState : errorOccured >
< O : ErrType | validErrName : EED S >
(Emergency eecerr withDesc EED) .
crl[oneErrorSovled] :
< NodeO : Node | errNo : s(N) >
=>
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< NodeO : Node | errNo : N >
if N > 0 .
rl[LastErrorSolved] :
< NodeO : Node | errNo : 1 >
=>
< NodeO : Node | errNo : 0,
nodeState : errorFree >
(Emergency eecclear withDesc clearErr) .
endom)
(omod NMT is
protecting NAT .
sort NetworkStatus .
op initialising : -> NetworkStatus .
op resetApp : -> NetworkStatus .
op resetComm : -> NetworkStatus .
op preOp : -> NetworkStatus .
op operation : -> NetworkStatus .
op stopped : -> NetworkStatus .
sort NmtMsg .
op node_bootUp : Oid -> NmtMsg .
op changeNode_toState_ : Oid NetworkStatus -> NmtMsg .
op changeAllNodesToState_ : NetworkStatus -> NmtMsg .
sort NmtRole .
op slave : -> NmtRole .
op master : -> NmtRole .
sort NodeStateRecord .
op node_in_ : Oid NetworkStatus -> NodeStateRecord .
sort NodeStateRecordList .
subsort NodeStateRecord < NodeStateRecordList .
op nilRdLt : -> NodeStateRecordList [ctor] .
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op __ : NodeStateRecordList NodeStateRecordList ->
NodeStateRecordList [ctor comm assoc id: nilRdLt] .
var NdRecd : NodeStateRecord .
vars NtSt NtSt2 : NetworkStatus .
vars OID OID2 : Oid .
var NdStRecdLst : NodeStateRecordList .
op updateRecord_toList_ :
NodeStateRecord NodeStateRecordList ->
NodeStateRecordList .
eq updateRecord NdRecd toList nilRdLt = NdRecd .
eq updateRecord (node OID in NtSt) toList (
(node OID2 in NtSt2) NdStRecdLst) = if OID == OID2
then
(node OID2 in NtSt) NdStRecdLst
else
(node OID2 in NtSt2)
(updateRecord (node OID in NtSt)
toList NdStRecdLst)
fi .
**** Update all nodes Status
op update_toState_ :
NodeStateRecordList NetworkStatus ->
NodeStateRecordList .
eq update nilRdLt toState NtSt = nilRdLt .
eq update ((node OID in NtSt) NdStRecdLst)
toState preOp =
if NtSt == stopped or
NtSt == operation
then
(node OID in preOp)
(update NdStRecdLst toState preOp)
else
(node OID in NtSt) update
NdStRecdLst toState preOp
fi .
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eq update ((node OID in NtSt)
NdStRecdLst) toState operation =
if NtSt == stopped or NtSt == preOp
then
(node OID in operation) (update
NdStRecdLst toState operation)
else
(node OID in NtSt) (update
NdStRecdLst toState operation)
fi .
eq update ((node OID in NtSt)
NdStRecdLst) toState stopped =
if NtSt == operation or NtSt == preOp
then
(node OID in stopped)
(update NdStRecdLst toState stopped)
else
(node OID in NtSt)
(update NdStRecdLst toState stopped)
fi .
eq update ((node OID in NtSt) NdStRecdLst)
toState resetApp =
if
NtSt == operation or NtSt == preOp or NtSt == stopped
then
(node OID in resetApp)
(update NdStRecdLst toState resetApp)
else
(node OID in NtSt)
(update NdStRecdLst toState resetApp)
fi .
eq update ((node OID in NtSt) NdStRecdLst)
toState resetComm =
if
NtSt == operation or NtSt == preOp or NtSt == stopped
then
(node OID in resetComm) (update NdStRecdLst
toState resetComm)
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else
(node OID in NtSt)
(update NdStRecdLst toState resetComm)
fi .
endom)
(omod NODE is
including NAT .
including EMERGENCY-OBJ .
including MESSAGE .
including CONTROLLER .
including MSG-RULES .
including STRING .
including NMT .
sort NodeStatus .
op errorFree : -> NodeStatus .
op errorOccured : -> NodeStatus .
subsort EmcyErrBody < FrameData MsgContent .
subsort NmtMsg < FrameData .
subsort String < Oid .
class Node | ID : Nat,
controllerID : Oid,
errNo : Nat,
nodeState : NodeStatus,
networkState : NetworkStatus,
slaveRecdLst : NodeStateRecordList,
nmtRole : NmtRole .
vars NodeO NodeO2 : Oid .
vars CtrlO CtrlO2 : Oid .
vars O O2 : Oid .
vars FID FID2 : Oid .
vars IDN IDN2 : Nat .
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vars N N2 N3 N4 : Nat .
vars NID NID2 : Nat .
var NdStatus : NodeStatus .
vars S S2 : EmcyErrNameSet .
var EED : EmcyErrBody .
vars BUF BUF2 BUF3 BUF4 : Que .
var FDATA : FrameData .
var NS : NatSet .
var F : Object .
var CONF : Configuration .
vars StRecdLst StRecdLst2 : NodeStateRecordList .
vars NetworkState NetworkState2 : NetworkStatus .
op calCODByNodeID_andMsgTypeID_ : Nat Nat -> Nat .
eq calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID N = NID * 10000 + N .
op pushMsg_toController_ : Object Object -> Object .
eq pushMsg F toController
< CtrlO : Controller | txbuf : BUF,
txbufCap : N2,
failedTxbuf : BUF2,
rxbuf : BUF3,
rxbufCap : N3,
failedRxbuf : BUF4,
filter : NS >
=
if N2 > length(BUF) then
< CtrlO : Controller | txbuf : F addTo BUF,
txbufCap : N2,
failedTxbuf : BUF2,
rxbuf : BUF3,
rxbufCap : N3,
failedRxbuf : BUF4,
filter : NS >
else
< CtrlO : Controller | txbuf : BUF,
txbufCap : N2,
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failedTxbuf : BUF2 : F,
rxbuf : BUF3,
rxbufCap : N3,
failedRxbuf : BUF4,
filter : NS >
fi .
rl [powerOn] :
< NodeO : Node | networkState : initialising >
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : resetApp > .
rl [initialization] :
< NodeO : Node | networkState : resetApp >
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : resetComm > .
rl [sendBootUp] :
< NodeO : Node | ID : NID,
controllerID : CtrlO,
errNo : 0,
nodeState : errorFree,
networkState : resetComm,
nmtRole : slave >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : preOp >
GLOBAL (CONF
(pushMsg < NodeO : Frame |
id : calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID 1792,
other : (node NodeO bootUp) >
toController < CtrlO : Controller | >)) .
rl [receiveBootUp] :
< NodeO : Node | ID : NID,
controllerID : CtrlO,
errNo : N,
98
nodeState : NdStatus,
slaveRecdLst : StRecdLst,
nmtRole : master >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf :
(< FID : Frame | id : NID2,
other : (node NodeO2 bootUp) > : BUF) >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst :
(updateRecord (node NodeO2 in preOp) toList StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >) .
crl [sendStartMsgToOneNode] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : master,
controllerID : CtrlO,
ID : NID,
slaveRecdLst :
(StRecdLst2 (node NodeO2 in NetworkState) StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst :
(StRecdLst2 (node NodeO2 in operation) StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
(pushMsg < NodeO : Frame |
id : (calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID 0),
other : (changeNode NodeO2 toState operation) >
toController < CtrlO : Controller | > ))
if NetworkState == preOp or NetworkState == stopped .
crl [receiveStartMsgFromMaster] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller |
rxbuf : < FID : Frame | id : NID,
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other : (changeNode NodeO toState operation) > :
BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : operation >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NetworkState == preOp or NetworkState == stopped .
crl [receiveAllStartMsg] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf :
< FID : Frame | id : NID,
other : (changeAllNodesToState operation) > :
BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : operation >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NetworkState == preOp or NetworkState == stopped .
crl [receiveNMTServiceWithUnmatchedID] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL ( CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : < FID : Frame | id : NID,
other : (changeNode NodeO2 toState NetworkState2) > :
BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : operation >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NodeO2 =/= NodeO .
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crl [sendStopRemoteNodeToSingleNode] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : master,
controllerID : CtrlO,
ID : NID,
slaveRecdLst : (StRecdLst2
(node NodeO2 in NetworkState) StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst :
(StRecdLst2 (node NodeO2 in stopped) StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
(pushMsg < NodeO : Frame |
id : (calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID 0),
other : (changeNode NodeO2 toState stopped) >
toController < CtrlO : Controller | > ))
if NetworkState == preOp or NetworkState == operation .
crl [sendStopRemoteNodeToAllNodes] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : master,
controllerID : CtrlO,
ID : NID,
slaveRecdLst : StRecdLst >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst : update
StRecdLst toState stopped >
GLOBAL (CONF
(pushMsg < NodeO : Frame |
id : calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID 0,
other : (changeAllNodesToState stopped) >
toController < CtrlO : Controller | > ))
if StRecdLst =/= nilRdLt .
crl [receiveStopRemoteNodeMsg] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
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networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf :
< FID : Frame | id : NID,
other : (changeNode NodeO toState stopped) > :
BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : stopped >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NetworkState == preOp or NetworkState == operation .
crl [receiveStopAllNodesMsg] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf :
< FID : Frame | id : NID,
other : (changeAllNodesToState stopped) > : BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : stopped >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NetworkState == preOp or NetworkState == operation .
crl [sendEnterPreMsgToSingleNode] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : master,
controllerID : CtrlO,
ID : NID,
slaveRecdLst :
(StRecdLst2 (node NodeO2 in NetworkState) StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst :
(StRecdLst2 (node NodeO2 in preOp) StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
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(pushMsg < NodeO : Frame |
id : (calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID 0),
other : (changeNode NodeO2 toState preOp) >
toController < CtrlO : Controller | > ))
if NetworkState == stopped or NetworkState == operation .
crl [sendEnterPreMsgToAllNodes] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : master,
controllerID : CtrlO,
ID : NID,
slaveRecdLst : StRecdLst >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst :
update StRecdLst toState preOp >
GLOBAL (CONF
(pushMsg < NodeO : Frame |
id : calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID 0,
other : (changeAllNodesToState preOp) >
toController < CtrlO : Controller | > ))
if StRecdLst =/= nilRdLt .
crl [receiveEnterPreMsg] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf :
< FID : Frame | id : NID,
other : (changeNode NodeO toState preOp) > :
BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : preOp >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NetworkState == stopped or NetworkState == operation .
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crl [receiveAllEnterPreMsg] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf :
< FID : Frame | id : NID,
other : (changeAllNodesToState preOp) > : BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : preOp >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NetworkState == stopped or NetworkState == operation .
crl [sendResetAppMsgToSingleNode] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : master,
controllerID : CtrlO,
ID : NID,
slaveRecdLst :
(StRecdLst2 (node NodeO2 in NetworkState) StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst :
(StRecdLst2 (node NodeO2 in resetApp) StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
(pushMsg < NodeO : Frame |
id : (calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID 0),
other : (changeNode NodeO2 toState resetApp) >
toController < CtrlO : Controller | > ))
if NetworkState == stopped or
NetworkState == operation or NetworkState == preOp .
crl [sendResetAppMsgToAllNodes] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : master,
controllerID : CtrlO,
ID : NID,
slaveRecdLst : StRecdLst >
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GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst :
update StRecdLst toState resetApp >
GLOBAL (CONF
(pushMsg < NodeO : Frame |
id : calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID 0,
other : (changeAllNodesToState resetApp) >
toController < CtrlO : Controller | > ))
if StRecdLst =/= nilRdLt .
crl [receiveResetAppMsg] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : < FID : Frame | id : NID,
other : (changeNode NodeO toState resetApp) > :
BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : resetApp >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NetworkState == stopped or
NetworkState == operation or NetworkState == preOp .
crl [receiveResetAllAppMsg] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : < FID : Frame | id : NID,
other : (changeAllNodesToState resetApp) > :
BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : resetApp >
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GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NetworkState == stopped or
NetworkState == operation or NetworkState == preOp .
crl [sendResetAppMsgToSingleNode] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : master,
controllerID : CtrlO,
ID : NID,
slaveRecdLst :
(StRecdLst2 (node NodeO2 in NetworkState) StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst :
(StRecdLst2 (node NodeO2 in resetApp) StRecdLst) >
GLOBAL (CONF
(pushMsg < NodeO : Frame |
id : (calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID 0),
other : (changeNode NodeO2 toState resetApp) >
toController < CtrlO : Controller | > ))
if NetworkState == stopped or
NetworkState == operation or NetworkState == preOp .
crl [sendResetAppMsgToAllNodes] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : master,
controllerID : CtrlO,
ID : NID,
slaveRecdLst : StRecdLst >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | slaveRecdLst : update
StRecdLst toState resetApp >
GLOBAL (CONF
(pushMsg < NodeO : Frame |
id : calCODByNodeID NID andMsgTypeID 0,
other : (changeAllNodesToState resetApp) >
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toController < CtrlO : Controller | > ))
if StRecdLst =/= nilRdLt .
crl [receiveResetCommMsg] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : < FID : Frame |
id : NID,
other : (changeNode NodeO toState resetComm) > :
BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : resetComm >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NetworkState == stopped or
NetworkState == operation or NetworkState == preOp .
crl [receiveResetAllComm] :
< NodeO : Node | nmtRole : slave,
controllerID : CtrlO,
networkState : NetworkState >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : < FID : Frame | id : NID,
other : (changeAllNodesToState resetComm) > :
BUF >)
=>
< NodeO : Node | networkState : resetComm >
GLOBAL (CONF
< CtrlO : Controller | rxbuf : BUF >)
if NetworkState == stopped or
NetworkState == operation or NetworkState == preOp .
endom)
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